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I. INTRODUCTION

Whistleblowing occurs when an employee discloses unethical or illegal
activities at work to a supervisor, the public, the media, or the
government.1 For the purpose of this Article, whistleblowing includes
"employee speech [that] invariably involve[s] some form of criticism
or
questioning of the public employer's policy, or of its specific actions, or of
supervisory personnel expressed either privately to the employer or
publicly."' It also includes speech "that the state institution is not properly
discharging its duties, or engaged in some way in misfeasance,
malfeasance or nonfeasance."3
An examination of newspapers and news websites reveals that
whistleblowers play an important role in enforcing accountability and
protecting the public.4 They expose violations of workplace safety and
health laws, employment laws, fraudulent accounting practices,
environmental laws, and other illegal or unethical practices;' however,
these whistleblowers often face repercussions.6

1. Lizabeth England, Civil Society: An On Line Journal. The EnglishLanguage Teaching
Forum, BusINEss ETHICS 3 (1999),available at http://exchanges.state.gov/forum/joumallbus4
background.htm; see also Joseph 0. Oluwole, Eras in the Public Employment-Free Speech
Jurisprudence,32 VT. L. REV. 317 (2007).

2. Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1985); see also John A. Gray, The Scope
of Whistleblower Protectionin the State of Maryland:A Comprehensive Statute is Needed,. 33 U.
BALT. L. REV. 225, 227-28 (2004).

3. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986).
4. See, e.g., Dwight Ott & Melanie Burney, Whistle-blower Outraged for Students,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 4, 2007.
5. See Roberta Ann Johnson & Michael.E. Kraft, BureaucraticWhistleblowing andPolicy

Change, 43 W. POL. Q. 849 (1990). While this Article focuses on whistleblowing public school
teachers, the same principles discussed in this Article would apply to all public employees.
6. Id.
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For example, public school teachers who blow the whistle on improper
employer practices face various repercussions. This occurred in MiamiDade County where Bennett Packman, a new physical education teacher
at American Senior High School, was told to teach driver's education
classes.7 After Packman informed the principal that he was not trained in
driver's education, the principal asked Packman to procure his certification
from Move On Toward Education and Training (MOTET). 8 Because
Packman believed MOTET was a fraudulent school, he refused to attend
the classes.9 Packman subsequently asked Florida education officials to
investigate the school.' ° Consequently, the school district cut-off his pay
and Packman appealed to the Miami-Dade Schools Office of Professional
Standards." As a result of his appeal, Packman was reassigned to a
different school.12
In another instance, Margaret Hall, a special education teacher at North
Mullins Primary School in Marion County, South Carolina, was terminated
after writing several letters to the editor of a local newspaper criticizing
some school board members' desire to spend $10,000 of taxpayer funds on
luxurious vacations. 13 Hall had been a teacher for over 22 years and had in
perpetuum received excellent performance evaluations." When the
superintendent of the school district failed to disclose the names of the
board members involved in spending taxpayer funds, Hall filed a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request for the names.' 5 Hall also wrote letters
to the editor of the local newspaper, the FlorenceMorningNews, and The
State criticizing the board's handling of taxpayer funds.' 6 The
superintendent responded by sending a memorandum to the board
characterizing Hall as a gadfly:

7. Kathy Lynn Gray, Teacher Told to Take CoursesBlew Whistle, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
July 10, 2005, at 4A.
8. Id.
9. Id. Even though the classes were physically taught in Miami, the academic credits for the
MOTET classes came from Eastern Oklahoma and Otterbein Colleges, both outside Florida, in
violation of state law requirements. He also refused to sign students' driver's education forms, fully
well aware that under the law, only teachers certified in driver's education could endorse the forms.
Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Gray, supra note 7.
13. Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 31 F.3d 183, 186 (4th Cir. 1994).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 186-87.
16. Id. at 187.
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Speaking of putting a lid on our current gadfly brings the note on
the enclosed newspaper letter to the editor. We... cannot say that
the barrage of opinions and innuendos does not bother us. The trick
is to not let her know how much a pain she is and where our pain is
located! ... Maybe enough rope will allow our gadfly to suspend
herself in an awkward position. Hopefully, it is an uncomfortable
one. 17

In a local newspaper advertisement, the superintendent threatened Hall:
REMEMBER THIS IF YOU WORK FOR A MAN, in Heaven's
name, WORK for him. If he pays you wages which supply you
bread and butter, work for him; speak well of him; stand by him and
stand by the institutions he represents. If put to a pinch, and [sic]
ounce of loyalty is worth a pound of cleverness. If you must vilify,
condemn and eternally disparage-resign your position, and when
you are outside, damn to your heart's content, but as long as you are
part of the institution do not condemn it. If you do that, you are
loosening the tendrils that are holding you to that institution, and at
the first high wind that comes along, you will be uprooted8 and
blown away, and probably will never know the reason why.'
Hall subsequently sent a letter to her principal, a copy to the State
Superintendent of Education, a copy to her U.S. Congressman, and a copy
to the President of the United States, pointing out problems with the school
district and its administration. 9 The workplace environment was
increasingly hostile to Hall, and she was subsequently terminated.20
Policymakers, administrators, and educators seem perplexed that
teachers whistleblow as often as their corporate counterparts. To inform
policymakers, administrators, educators, the judiciary, and the public about
the frequency of teacher whistleblowing, and to further illustrate its
inclemency, the author will present other examples of teacher
whistleblowing and consequent disciplinary actions. Though not garnering
the media attention of corporate whistleblowing, teacher whistleblowing
is variegated. Teachers "blow the whistle" for violations including poor

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. (intemal quotes omitted).
Hall, 31 F.3d at 187.
Id. at 188.
See id. at 188-90.
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treatment of students; 2' mismanagement of taxpayer funds;2 2 lowering of
academic standards; 23 inappropriate alteration of student grades; 24 school
board violations of open-meetings laws; 25 removal of books from the
28
27
libraries; 26 mismanagement of budget; lack of concern for students;
failure to offer needed courses; 29 disregard of teacher morale;3" sacrifice of
academic quality for increased enrollment;" lack of professionalism;32
proposed retaliatory transfer ofteachers;33 politically-motivated transfer of
teachers; 34 unwarranted severity of corporal punishment;35 sexual
misconduct against students;" and board decisions to terminate athletic
programs.37
Other examples ofwhistleblowing include: suppression of evidence and
fraudulent alteration of documents; violations of safety protocols;3 racial
discrimination; 4° falsification of state required reports; 4' inaccurate
compilation of statistical data or reports; 42 misrepresentations by
supervisors; 43 violations of the National Federation of Cheerleaders

21. See, e.g., Starsky v. Williams, 512 F.2d 109,110 (9th Cir. 1975).
22. See, e.g., Hall, 31 F.3d at 186.
23. See, e.g., Storlazzi v. Bakey, 894 F. Supp. 494, 499 (D. Mass. 1995).
24. Id. at 501.
25. See, e.g., Dishnow v. Sch. Dist. of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194, 196 (7th Cir. 1996).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Stroman v. Colleton County Sch. Dist., 981 F.2d 152, 154 (4th Cir. 1992).
28. See, e.g., Daulton v. Affeldt, 678 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1982).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Lewis v. Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 1, 805 F.2d 310, 312 (8th Cir. 1986).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Wichert v. Walter, 606 F. Supp. 1516, 1518 (D.N.J. 1985).
35. See, e.g., Bowman v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 642 (8th Cir.
1983).
36. See, e.g., Cromley v. Bd. of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1994).
37. See, e.g., McGee v. S. Pemiscot Sch. Dist. R-V, 712 F.2d 339, 341 (8th Cir. 1983)
(school board decided to terminate junior high track).
38. See, e.g., Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 629 F.2d 993, 996, 1003 (5th Cir. 1980).
39. See, e.g., Swilley v. Alexander, 629 F.2d 1018, 1019 (5th Cir. 1980) (showing where a
principal allowed "young children to go outdoors for tornado drills during lightning storms and
...[sent] home unattended small children without notifying the children's parents").
40. See, e.g., Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 768 (4th Cir. 2004); Bemheim v. Litt, 79
F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1996).
41. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-50-1403(2) (2008).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 809 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Guidelines;" violations of practice times and venues for athletics;45 and
placements of ineligible students on athletic teams. 6
Teachers have whistleblown about placements of special education
students;47 classroom observation notice policies;48 principals' stratagems
to obtain early contract renewal;49 and violations of the Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA).5
As with whistleblowers in the corporate sector, teachers who expose
wrongdoings often face retailiation. These retaliatory acts take various
forms including nonrenewal of contract;51 hostile work environment;52
termination;53 suspension with pay;54 closer scrutiny of performance;55
reprimand;56 demotion;57 lowered performance evaluations; 58 involuntary
transfers;59 strict enforcement of school rules; 60 incommunicado

44. See, e.g., Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County Bd. of Educ., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1270
(M.D. Ala. 2005), aff'd, 186 Fed. Appx. 885 (11th Cir. 2006).
45. See, e.g., Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Wytrwal v. Saco Sch. Bd., 70 F.3d 165, 268 (1st Cir. 1995).
48. See, e.g., Storlazzi v. Bakey, 894 F. Supp. 494, 499 (D. Mass. 1995).
49. See, e.g., Lifton v. Bd. of Educ., 290 F. Supp. 2d 940, 942-43 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
50. See, e.g., Khuans v. Sch. Dist. 110, 123 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 1997) (where the
school district failed to notify parents about educational planning meetings, administrative
classification of children prior to a diagnostic team's input, change of special education students'
placements and services without a diagnostic team's input or parental notification, and disregard
of individualized educational programs (IEP) of special education children).
51. See, e.g., Gremingerv. Seaborne, 584 F.2d 275,276(8th Cir. 1978); Starsky v. Williams,
512 F.2d 109, 110 (9th Cir. 1975).
52. See, e.g., Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 2004); Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist.
No. 2, 31 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 1994); Bernheim, 79 F.3d 318 (2d Cir. 1996) (assignment of
whistleblowing teacher with difficulty climbing stairs due to physical disabilities, to a fifth floor
classroom).
53. See, e.g., Hall, 31 F.3d at 190.
54. See, e.g., Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 810 (10th Cir. 1996).
55. See, e.g., Hall, 31 F.3d at 188.
56. See, e.g., Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1999); Lewis v.
Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 1,805 F.2d 310, 316-17 (8th Cir. 1986); Swilley v. Alexander, 629 F.2d
1018, 1019 (5th Cir. 1980).
57. See, e.g., Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 7774-75.
58. See, e.g., id. at 766; Cromleyv. Bd.ofEduc., 17 F.3d 1059,1062 (7thCir. 1994); Wren
v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1986).
59. See, e.g., McGill v. Bd. of Educ., 602 F.2d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 1979); Harris, 168 F.3d
at 216 (where the whistleblower was transferred to a center for disruptive students to teach subjects
and grade levels he had never taught before).
60. See, e.g., Wren, 798 F.2d at 1316.
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interrogations;6 ' institution of disciplinary proceedings; 62 and failure to
promote.63
Retaliatory acts against teachers also include assignments of inferior
teaching schedules;' reduced preparation periods; 65 assignments of non
instructional duties; 66 transfer of students to different classes; 67 failure to
properly process claim forms; 68 removal of locks and belongings from
storage areas; 69 persona non grata treatment;7" denial of access to the
grievance and arbitration process;7 ' failure to honor seniority and priority
for recall;7 2 merger of one department into another; 73 requirement of
justification of teaching methods;1 4 denial of access to student records and
school equipment; 75 inaccurate maintenance of files;7 6 threats;7 7 reduction
in pay;78 abolition of previously held positions; 79 constructive discharge; 0
withholding of work;"' denial of adequate personnel to perform duties;82

61. See e.g., O'Brien v. Town of Caledonia, 748 F.2d 403,404 (7th Cir. 1984).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Trotman v. Bd of Trs. of Lincoln Univ., 635 F.2d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 1980).
64. See, e.g., Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1986).
65. See, e.g., Bermheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318,322 (2d Cir. 1996).
66. Id.; see, e.g., Storlazzi v. Bakey, 894 F. Supp. 494, 499. (D. Mass. 1995) (making
whistleblowing teacher supervise his or her own detention hall).
67. See, e.g., Storlazzi, 894 F. Supp. at 494.
68. See, e.g., Bernheim, 79 F.3d at 322.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Brammer-Hoelterv. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1090,1093 (D.
Colo. 2000).
71. See, e.g., Storlazzi, 894 F. Supp. at 499..
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Cromley v. Bd. of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1994).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932(1) (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-2703(4) (2007); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-50-1403(1) (West 2008).
78. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52(B)(5) (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §

42.41.020(3)(a) (West 2008).
79. See, e.g., Cromley v. Bd. of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1994).
80. See, e.g., Lifton v. Bd. of Educ., 290 F. Supp. 2d 940, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2003). "A
constructive discharge takes place 'when an employer deliberately renders the employee's working
conditions intolerable and thus forces him to quit his job."' English v. Powell, 592 F.2d 727, 731
n.4 (4th Cir. 1979) (quoting Muller v. U.S. Steel Corp, 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir. 1975)). See
also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1502(A) (2008).
81. MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.055(4) (West 2008).
82. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.61 l(5)(a) (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §

42.41.020(3)(a) (West 2008).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 19

frequent replacement of staff members;83 frequent and85 undesirable office
86
relocations; 84 refusal to assign meaningful work; admonishment;
reduction in rank; 87 reclassification; 8 removal of duties; 89 refusal to restore
duties;9" verbal or physical harassment; 9' implementation of surveillance
measures;92 discrimination; 93 denial of education or training;9 4 failure to
96
increase base pay; 9 5 requirement of fitness-for-duty examinations;
requirement of disability retirement; 97 frequent changes in working hours
or workdays; 98 withholding earned salary increases or benefits; 99 and
referrals for psychiatric or psychological counseling.0 0
Central to the examples above, and in all situations where teachers
whistleblow, is that teachers who whistleblow exercise their foundational
constitutional right to free speech.' This right is guaranteed by the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment0 2 and applicable to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 According to the U.S. Supreme Court,

83. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.61 1(5)(b) (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §

42.41.020(3)(a) (West 2008).
84. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.611(5)(c) (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §

42.41.020(3)(a) (West 2008).
85. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.611(5)(d) (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
42.41.020(3)(a) (West 2008).
86. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-2703(4) (West 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-50-1403(1)
(West 2008).
87. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-2703(4) (2007).
88. Id.
89. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.80(2)(a) (West 2008).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.86(1) (West 2008).
93. UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-2(1) (West 2008).
94. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.80(2)(b) (West 2008).
95. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.80(2)(d) (West 2008).
96. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-2703(4) (LexisNexis 2008).
97. Id.
98. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.611(5)(1) ([LexisNexis 2008).
99. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.34 1(B)(2) (West 2008).
100. D.C. CODE § 2-223.01(6) (2001); D.C. CODE § 1-615.52(5) (2001).
101. Sometimes, prior to whistleblowing, the teachers who are terminated for whistleblowing
had several years of teaching experience with consistently positive evaluations. See, e.g., Hall v.
Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 860 F. Supp. 278, 282 (D. S.C. 1993).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress shall
make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech .... Id.
103. The First Amendment is made applicable to the states via the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment which provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
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however, "[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been treated
as absolutes. Freedom of speech or press does not mean that one can talk
or distribute where, when and how one chooses ....By adjustment ' of4
rights, we can have both full liberty of expression and an orderly life."'
The lingering question is how great an adjustment in rights the Court is
willing to sanction so as to ensure an orderly life. It is undeniable,
however, that "the threat of dismissal from public employment is ...a
potent means of inhibiting speech."' ' Moreover, the protection of free
speech in the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for0the
bringing about of political and social changes
6
desired by the people."'
In Pickeringv. BoardofEducation,0 ° the U.S. Supreme Court set forth
a balancing test for addressing First Amendment claims of teachers and all
public employees who allege employment retaliation for exercise of their
free speech rights.0 8 Despite the fact that the text of the First Amendment
says nothing about the interests of an employer,'0 9 the Pickeringbalancing
test requires a fluid and unfettered "balancing of the public employer's
interests in operational efficiency against the free speech rights of
employees."" 0 Until recent cases, the Pickeringbalancing test was used as
a good-faith attempt to protect public employees' free speech rights. In the
application and interpretation of the balancing test, however, recent cases
reveal a proclivity for favoring the employer's operational efficiency over
employee free speech rights. This proclivity could provide a license to
"school boards to dismiss teachers for reasons of political expendiency
rather than legitimate pedagogy.""' In what has amounted to pseudobalancing, this approach fails to sufficiently consider teachers' rights as
citizens to speak about issues of the day. According to dclat constitutional
law scholar Gunther, in interpreting and applying balancing tests, "the
single most important trait for responsiblebalancing [is] the capacity to

deprive any person of life, or liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
104. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951).
105. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
106. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 568.
109. Oluwole, supra note 1, at 320.
110. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
111. Karen C. Daly, BalancingAct: Teachers' ClassroomSpeech andthe FirstAmendment,
30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 2 (2001).
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each analytically distinct ingredient of the
identify and evaluate separately
' 2
contending interests." "1
II. ROAD MAP TO ARTICLE

The author proposes a constitutional framework based on the three-tier
framework used in Equal Protection jurisprudence. To account for multiple
categories of whistleblowing speech, the author proposes this three-tier
system to replace the current single-tier system used in the Pickering
balancing test. A new three-tier system would ensure greater protection for
teacher whistleblowing as well as opportunities for employers to proffer
operational efficiency to defend retaliatory actions against employees for
their speech."' In proposing this new approach, the author will address
three questions:
1. What are the eras in the United States Supreme Court's public
employment-free speech jurisprudence?
2. Is there a way to categorize the types of speech that whistleblowing
teachers engage in under the Court's public employment-free speech
jurisprudence?
3. What is the author's proposed constitutional framework for analyzing
whistleblowing cases under the Court's public employment-free speech
jurisprudence?
In Part III, the author categorizes the Supreme Court public
employment-free speech jurisprudence, from pre-Pickeringto date, into
various eras.' ' In Part IV, the author will classify speech under the
jurisprudence into various categories. Finally, in Part V, the author will
propose a constitutional test for analyzing cases under public employmentfree speech jurisprudence.

112. Gerald Gunther, Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1972) (emphasis added) (internal
quotes omitted).
113. The U.S. Supreme Court considers public employee whistleblowing speech (including
that of public school teachers) under its public employment-free speech jurisprudence; thus, the
author's reference to public employment-free speech jurisprudence in this Article is inclusive of the
whistleblowing First Amendment jurisprudence.
114. See Oluwole, supra note 1, at 320-21.
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Il. ERAS IN THE SUPREME COURT'S PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT-FREE
SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court's public employment-free speech jurisprudence has
unfolded in four discernable eras. "5 These eras are: (a) Categorical Denial;
(b) Recognition of Undefined Scope; (c) Balancing Scope; and (d) OE >
MPC Speech." 6
A. Era of CategoricalDenial
Prior to 1952, "public employers could place any limitation, including
constitutional limitations, on the conditions of employment for any
employee because public employment was a privilege, [and] not a right.""..7
While a non-government employee citizen was entitled to First
Amendment protection,"' any citizen who took government employment
automatically became automatically subject to judicially-sanctioned
strictures on the right to free speech." 9 Justice Holmes's famous epigram
aptly captures the public employment-free speech jurisprudence in this era:
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman.' ' 21 In essence, there was no
constitutionally protected right to whistleblow; therefore, public employees
could be disciplined or terminated for whistleblowing without
constitutional remedies. Accordingly, in this era, free speech rights for
public whistleblowing
employees were completely denied protection under
2
the Constitution.' '

115. See id.
116. OE refers to "operational efficiency" interests of the public employer, and MPC Speech
refers to the employee's interest in speech on matters of public concern. Id. The greater than (>)
mathematical symbol represents the trend in this era of Supreme Court interpretation of the
elements and aspects of the Pickeringbalancing test that resulted in increasingly greater weight
granted to the "operational efficiency" element of the balancing test relative to the "employee
interest in speech on matters of public concern." Id.
117. Id.at321.
118. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, passed in 1791, provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S CONST. amend. I. While the
express language of the First Amendment refers to Congress, it is applicable to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause passed in 1868. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 48-49 (1985).
119. See Oluwole, supra note 1, at 321.
120. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
121. See Oluwole, supra note 1, at 322.
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B. Era of Recognition: Undefined Scope
In December 1952, the Supreme Court limited the unlimited power of
public employers to deny First Amendment rights to their employees. 22
23 In Wieman, a public
The breakthrough case was Wieman v. Updegraff.'
employee brought a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a state statute
which, as a qualification for employment, required public employees to
swear loyalty oaths. 124 Invalidating the statute, the Court held that patently
arbitrary or discriminatory government acts against an employee are
unconstitutional. 125 Its corollary might be that if the government act was
not patently arbitrary or discriminatory, the action would withstand
constitutional scrutiny. 126 While this was a freedom of association case,
Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, cautioned that loyalty oaths could
be used as a tool of tyranny to impose extraordinary perils onfree speech
and shackle the minds of free people;127 therefore, Justice Black beseeched28
the majority for First Amendment protection of public employee speech.1
He famously admonished the majority:
We must have freedom of speech for all or we will in the long run
have it for none but the cringing and the craven. And I cannot too
public
often repeat my belief that the right to speak on matters of
129
concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost.
The reference to "matters of public concern," was a progenitor in the
public employment-free speech jurisprudence and became a staple of the
jurisprudence. 3 '
The Court finally adhered to Justice Black's admonition in Shelton v.
Tucker,"' recognizing freedom of speech as a right, which, like freedom
of association, is vulnerable to extraordinary perils and abuse by the
government public employer. 31 2 Subsequently, in this efflorescent era of
public employment-free speech recognition and enforcement, in Crampv.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
344 U.S. 183 (1952).
Id. at 184; see generally supra note 103.
Wieman, 344 U.S. at 192.
Id.
Id. at 193-94 (Black, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 193.
See Oluwole, supra note 1, at 324.
364 U.S. 479 (1960).
Oluwole supra note 1, at 324-25.
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BoardofPublicInstruction,'33and then in Torcasov. Watkins, 34 the Court
reaffirmed constitutional protection against patently arbitrary or
discriminatory action. 35 Two years after Cramp and Torcaso, the Court in
Sherbert v. Verner,'36 reaffirmed the era of recognition of public
employees' free speech rights, stating that "[i]t is too late in the day to
doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed
37 by the
denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.'1
The leitmotiv of this era was the Court's recognition and protection of
public employees' free speech rights. Thus, with this Era of Recognition,
the Era of Categorical Denial was indubitably brought to a close. Even
though recognition was a breakthrough for employees in this era, the scope
of the recognized rights was undefined. In other words, the Court failed to
articulate a test for determining when employers could restrict or deny
employee free speech rights without contravening the First Amendment.
Finally, in 1968, in Pickering,3 8 the Court would set out to define the
scope of public employees' free speech
rights recognized in the "Era of
39
Recognition: Undefined Scope.'
C. Era of Balancing: Scope
In the "Era of Balancing: Scope," the Court ventured to define the
scope of public employees' free speech rights, and Pickering was the
seminal case in formulating this definition.141 In Pickering,a public school
teacher was terminated by the school board for his criticism of his
employer in a newspaper article.' 41 In the article, he criticized the board
and the superintendent for their handling of various proposals to raise
revenues as well as for a misallocation of school funds.'42 The teacher
challenged his termination
as a violation of his right to free speech under
43
Amendment.
the First
The Court stated that the nature of an employment relationship between
a government and public employer-public employee demands that the

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

368 U.S. 278 (1961).
367 U.S. 488 (1961).
Cramp, 368 U.S. at 288; see Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495-96.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Oluwole, supra note 1, at 327.
Id.
Pickering,391 U.S. at 566.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 565.
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Court account for the operational efficiency of the public employer in a
First Amendment constitutional analysis.'44 Therefore, the public employer
must be able to maintain some control over its employees' speech.145 The
Court then enunciated the Pickeringbalancing test for defining the scope
of protected employee speech. 146 The test provides:
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through
47
its employees.
The balancing test has two key parts: "employee
interest in speech" and
"employer interest in operational efficiency. ' 48
An aspect of the "employee interest in speech" is the "matter of public
concern" (MPC) requirement: that is, to be protected against employer
retaliation, the employee speech must touch on a matter of public
concern. 49 "The other aspect of the 'employee interest in speech' within
the balancing test is the 'as citizen' versus 'as employee' status of the
employee's speech." oFundamentally, "to determine whether a particular
speech is within the scope of protected speech, a balance [has to] be struck
between the employer and employee's interests within the operational
confines of the Pickeringtest. '
In aid of this balancing, there are certain identifiable factors in the
opinion, known as the Pickeringcalculus factors.'52 When applied, some
of the factors would more likely weigh in favor of the employer, while
others weigh relatively in favor of the employee.'53 Factors that could be
viewed as pro-employer in the Pickeringbalancing test include:

144. Id. at 568.
145. Oluwole, supra note 1, at 328.
146. See Pickering,391 U.S. at 568.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. This is the "matter of public concern," Justice Black progenitored in Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (Black, J., concurring); Oluwole, supra note 1, at 328.
150. See Pickering,391 U.S. at 568.
151. Oluwole, supra note 1, at 328.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 328-29. Given that both sides, as in adversarial litigation, have a chance to make
arguments about each factor, many of the factors could work in the favor of either side. Id. at 329.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT-FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE: A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL TEST

2008]

435

(a) whether the speech would impact harmony among coworkers or
the employee's immediate supervisor's ability to maintain
discipline; (b) whether the speech is directed toward someone with
whom the employee would typically be in contact during his daily
work; and (c) whether the nature of the employment relationship
between the employee and the person toward whom the speech is
loyalty and confidence are critical
directed is so close that personal
54
to their proper functioning.
Factor (b) is known as the "close working relationship" factor, 55 and factor
(c) is known as the "confidentiality" factor.'56
Factors that could be relatively more pro-employee in the balancing test
include: (a) the employee's interest in commenting on matters of public
concern and the public's interest in free and unhindered debate on matters
of public importance;' 57 (b) the fact that public employees are more likely
than the general citizenry to have informed and definite opinions about the
matter in question;' 58 (c) the ease with which the employer could rebut the
content of the employee's statement, if it were false;' 59 and (d) whether
there is evidence that the speech actually had an adverse impact on the
employer's proper functioning. 6 °
The Court held that the critical tone of a letter alone is not sufficient to
take employee speech on matters of public interest outside of the scope of
speech protected against employer retaliation, when those statements are
substantially correct."'6 The Court also held that speech constituting false
statements is also within the scope of protected speech, unless the false
statements were intentionally or recklessly made.' 62 In its decision, the
Court assumed, without apologia, that the funding of the school district
was an issue of public concern and thus within the scope of speech
protected against employer retaliation.
In Perryv. Sindermann,'63 the Court expanded the scope of protected
public employee speech to include testimony before a legislative

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 329 n.91.
Oluwole, supra note 1, at 329 n.92.
See Pickering,391 U.S. at 573.
See id. at 572.
Id.
Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 570.
Pickering,391 U.S. at 573.
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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committee. 1" In making this determination, the Court applied one of the
factors in the Pickeringcalculus-the employee's interest in commenting
on matters of public concern and the concomitant interest of the public in
free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance.' 65
Additionally, the Court held that a public employee's non-tenured status
was not sufficient in itself to take speech out of the scope of protected
speech.' 66
Four years later, in Madison Joint School DistrictNo. 8 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm 'n,'67 applying the Pickeringbalancing test,
the Court again expanded the scope of protected speech to include
employee speech in forums open to citizen involvement.168 The essence of
this era was the definition of the scope of protected employee speech via
balancing that genuinely accounted for the interests of the employee in
speech on matters of public concern and the interests of the employer in
operational efficiency and balancing both interests without defacto or de
jure weights assigned one interest over the other.' 69 Accordingly, this era
resulted in a greater expanse of employee rights within the scope of
protected speech. 7 ° Since Pickering, Perry, and Madison Joint School
DistrictNo. 8, however, the Court's interpretation of parts and aspects of
the balancing test have defacto and dejure created the current era of the
7
jurisprudence labeled by the author as the "era of OE > MPC Speech.' '
D. Era of OE > MPC Speech
The Pickering balancing test states: "The problem in any case is to
arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees. ' 172 Also recall that there are two key parts
to the balancing test: "employee interest in speech" versus "employer
interest in operational efficiency;" and these two interests are weighed

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 584-95.
See id. at 598.
Id. at 597.
429 U.S. 167 (1976).
See id.
at 175.
See Oluwole, supra note 1, at 332.
See id. at 327-32.
See id. at 332.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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against each other in the test.1 73 One aspect of the "employee interest in
speech" element is the "matter of public concern" (MPC) requirement: to
be protected against employer retaliation, employee speech must touch on
a matter of public concern. 114 The other requirement of the "employee
interest in speech" is7 the "as citizen" versus "as employee" status of the
employee's speech. 1
As titled, the Court's interpretative favoritism of the operational
of the test
efficiency element in the test has thus eroded the original intent
76
to be a balance between employee and employer interests.1
The "OE > MPC Speech" era began in 1977 in Mount Healthy City
School DistrictBoardofEducation v. Doyle. 77 In this case, a public school
teacher was terminated after he disclosed, to a radio station, a new
mandatory dress for teachers. 78 The dress code was adopted because
school administrators believed that teacher appearance correlated with
public support for bond initiatives.179 The teacher challenged the board's
decision not to renew his contract as a violation of his constitutional rights
to free speech. 8° This was the first case in which the Court addressed the
role of "mixed motives" in the Pickeringbalancing test.' 8 '
"Mixed motives" arise where a public employer disciplines an
employee ostensibly for the employee's speech, yet other reasons
centrolineal to the discipline are proffered by the employer. 8 2 Therefore,
'
courts have to determine the employer's actual and pretentious motives. 83
This "analysis involves an attempt to ascertain cause and effect: what was
the actual cause of the employer's discipline of the employee?"' 84 The
teacher's background in Mount Healthy, prior to the speech, coupled with
his speech to the radio station served as mixed motives for his
termination.' 85 This background included a fight with a colleague, an
argument with cafeteria employees, and obscene gestures to female

173.
note 1.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See supra Part iII.C (discussing "Era of Balancing: Scope"); see also Oluwole, supra
Oluwole, supra note 1, at 332.
Id.
Id.at 333.
429 U.S. 274 (1977).
Id. at 282.
Id.
Id. at276.
See id.
Oluwole, supra note 1, at 334.

183. Id.

184. Id.
185. Id.
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students. 8 6 The Supreme Court refused to order the
teacher's
187
reinstatement, consequent to its "mixed motives" analysis.
The district court had adopted a causation rule which stated: as long as
the employee speech had a "substantial part" in the employer's termination
decision, the employee notwithstanding, the employee is entitled to
reinstatement.188 In rejecting this rule as irrebuttably dispositive in the
"mixed motives" analysis, the Supreme Court expressed concern that the
rule would hamper the control of public employers over personnel
decisions and force employers to retain inefficient employees who would
have been terminated absent the speech. The Court was foremost
concerned about operational efficiency. 89 Thus, the Court reasoned, the
rule might place the speaking employee in a better off position than he or
she would have been without the speech.' 90 Relative weighting of
operational efficiency over MPC speech continued with the Court's
formulation of a burden-of-proof allocation framework for "mixed
motives" cases under the Pickering balancing test.' 9 ' Consequently, the
balance of burdens was a development and interpretation of the Pickering
balancing test. The framework provides:
1. The initial burden of proof is on the public employee to show that (a)
the employee's conduct is protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments; 192 and (b) that the conduct was "a substantial factor" or
a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision to discipline the
employee. The "substantial factor" or "motivating factor" language
represents the Court's causation test in "mixed motives" analysis,
however, it is rebuttable.'93 Nevertheless, the Court's requirement of a
"substantial factor," rather than just a "factor," in proof is an indicium
ofOE > Speech on MPC. If the employee is unable to carry this burden,
the constitutional question is to be resolved in favor of the employer."4
2. If the employee successfully carries this burden of proof, the employer
could then show, by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that it

186. Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281-82 (1977).
187. Seeid. at284.
188. Id.

189. Id. at 285-86.
190. Id. at 285.

191. See Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. This burden ofproofallocation is also known as the
Mount Healthy "balance of burdens," the Mount Healthy fiamework, or the "mixed motives"
framework.
192. Id. at 287.
193. Id. at 287.
194. See id.
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would have reached the same decision about disciplining the employee
without the protected speech.'95 This is the "same decision anyway"
defense, and it provides an affirmative defense9 for
employers,' 96 which
7
MPC.1
on
is further indicium ofOE > Speech
Furthermore, the entire framework, including the "same decision anyway"
affirmative defense could buoy employers to concoct post-hoc, multiple
motives, other than restricting the employee's free speech, in justification
of the inflicted discipline. Allowing the employer to recast what in
actuality is a "single motive," employee
exercise of free speech rights, as
' 98
a sham stratagem: "mixed motives.'
Fundamentally, in the era of OE > MPC Speech, diminution of
employer rights against employee speech within the Pickeringbalancing
test has been de minimis. 19 In fact, it has enjoyed preferment as a
consequence of the significance the Court attaches to the operational
efficiency of the public employer and the materiality of personnel
control.2"0 This trend would continue in Connick v. Myers,2"' as the Court
tried to unfurl the "matter of public concern" aspect of the Pickering
balancing test.2 2 Notwithstanding the fact that "matter of public concern"
is an aspect of the employee part of the Pickering balancing test,
the
203
MPC.
on
Speech
>
OE
affirmed
effectively
interpretation
Court's
First, the Court made it a threshold requirement for the application of
the Pickering balancing test to determine whether the matter that is the
subject of the speech is simply an employment dispute or a matter of public
concern. 2" If simply an employment dispute, courts will defer to the

195. Id.
196. See Mount Heathy,429 U.S. at 287. The Mount Healthy"same decision anyway" defense
is also known as the Mount Healthy defense.
197. Id.
198. Oluwole, supra note 1, at 336.
199. Id. In Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987), the Court extended some rights to
employees, noting that "[a] public employer may not divorce a statement made by an employee
from its context by requiring the employee to repeat the statement, and use that statement standing
alone as the basis for a discharge." Id. at 387 n. 10. Additionally, the Court held that private speech
of employees who have no (a) confidential, (b) policymaking, or (c) public contact role poses very
minimal danger to their employers. Id. at 390-91. While this case extended these rights to public
employees, it did not reverse the primacy of operational efficiency over MPC speech in the
jurisdiction.
200. Oluwole, supra note 1, at 338.
201. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
202. Id. at 140.
203. See id.
204. See id.at 146-47.
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employer action against the employee, unless some ground other than the
First Amendment is presented.20 5 If the speech, however, touches on a
matter of public concern, the Pickeringbalancing test is triggered.20 6
The Court set forth the test for determining whether public employee
speech constitutes speech on MPC: "Whether an employee's speech
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content,
form, and context of a given statement."20 7 The content, form, and context
of the statement must be examined to determine whether the employee's
speech "relat[es] to any matter ofpolitical,social, or other concern to the
community.'2 8 If the speech fails this test, then "absent the most unusual
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency
allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior. '29 The Court, however,
failed to specify
what would constitute the "most unusual
210
circumstances."
Continuing the primacy of operational efficiency over speech on MPC,
in its discourse of the Pickering balancing test, the Court held variously
that public employers must retain "wide discretion," "control," "wide
latitude" over the permissability of employee speech, "wide degree of
deference to employer judgment" and the prerogative to terminate
employees hindering efficiency.211 In the same spirit, the Court held that
"[w]hen employee speech concerning office policy arises from an
employment dispute concerning the very application of that policy to the
speaker, additionalweight must be given to the supervisor's view that the
2 12
employee has threatened the authority of the employer to run the office.,
In a countermand of a Pickering calculus factor, certifying the
underpinning of the current era, the Court held that employers could rely
on speculations about the disruptiveness of speech to operational efficiency
in disciplining employees. 213 The requirement in Pickeringof evidence of
actual adverse impact of speech on operational efficiency was no more.214

205. Id. at 146-47, 151.
206. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 142-47.
207. Id. at 147-48 (emphasis added). This test is known as the Connick test. See Oluwole,
supra note 1, at 338.
208. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-48 (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
210. See id.
211. Seeid. at 151-53.
212. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
213. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152.
214. See supra Part III.C (discussing this Pickeringcalculus factor); see also Oluwole, supra
note 1.
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Interpretation and development of the Pickeringbalancing test would
continue in Waters v. Churchill 5 as the Court sought to develop the
"content" component of the "content, form and context" test for matter of
public concern.216 Specifically, the Court made a procedural determination
as to whether the content of employee speech should be determined from
the government employer's perspective or from the trier of fact's
perspective. 2 The ruling further truncated employee speech protection by
increasing the primacy of operational efficiency in the era.21 8 With respect
to the procedural determination, the plurality held that courts must defer to
the employers' version of the content." 9 While the plurality did state that
employer determinations of the content of employee speech must be
reasonable, 2 it conceded that:
there will often be situations in which reasonable employers would
disagree about who is to be believed, or how much investigation
needs to be done, or how much evidence is needed to come to a
particular conclusion. In those situations, many different courses of
action will necessarily be reasonable. Only procedures outside the
range of what a reasonable manager would use may be condemned
as unreasonable.2 1
If the discretion of an indeterminate and fluid range of "reasonableness" is
given to public employers, employee rights are consequently tenebrous.
Furthermore, the Court held that public employers do not need to
tolerate verbal tumult nor rely on counterspeech as a remedy to employee
speech.2 2 In so holding, the plurality effectively undermined the "ease of
rebuttal" factor in the Pickeringcalculus. 23 In further affirmation of the
primacy of operational efficiency in the era, the plurality held that "[w]hen
someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency's
effective operation begins to do or say things that detract from the agency's
effective operation, the government employer must have some power to
restrain her., 224 The plurality also emphasized a tradition of deference to
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

511 U.S. 661 (1994).
Id. at 664.
Id.
See generally Waters, 511 U.S. at 661.
Id. at 677.
See id at 677-78 (emphasis added).
Id. at 678.
See id.
See supra Part III.C (discussing the "ease of rebuttal" Pickering calculus factor).
Waters, 511 U.S. at 675.
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judgments of public employers in its public employment-free speech
jurisprudence. 2 5 This tradition of deference would continue in San Diego
v. Roe,22 6 with the Court holding that:
requir[ing] Pickering balancing in every case where speech by a
public employee is at issue, no matter the content of the speech,
could compromise the properfunctioningofgovernment offices...
This concern [i.e., concern about operational efficiency] prompted
the Court in Connick to explain a threshold inquiry (implicit in
Pickeringitself) that in order to merit Pickeringbalancing, a public
employee's speech must touch on a matter of public concern. 227
At heart, the Court held that the "matter of public concern" requirement
and the Connick test were created to avoid compromising operational
efficiency and the interest of the public employer; concern for the free
speech rights of employees is not included in this rationale. 2 8
Nevertheless, the Court held that MPC "is something that is a subject of
'
legitimate news interest ... [to employees] at the time of publication."229

The most recent decision in the current era is Garcettiv. Ceballos.230 In
that case, the Court tried to clarify the distinction between the "as citizen"
status and the "as employee" status in the Pickering balancing test.
Therefore, Garcetti was a further interpretation and development of
Pickering. Recall that in Pickering,the Court held that the balancing test
is only applicable to an employee who speaks "as a citizen" on a matter of
public concern. 3
The test the Court formulated for this purpose provides that "when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and
the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline. 232 This is the "pursuant to official duties" test, or the Garcetti
test, and it is Garcetti's contribution to the public employment-free speech

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
Oluwole,
232.

Id. at 673.
543 U.S. 77 (2004).
Id. at 82-83 (emphasis added) (internal quotes omitted).
Id at 83.
Id. at 84.
126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
See supraPart 1II.C (discussing Pickering under the "Era of Balancing: Scope"); see also
supra note 1.
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960 (emphasis added).
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jurisprudence. Intrinsic to the Garcetti test is the primacy of operational
efficiency. 3
The Court failed to define the phrases "pursuant to" and "official
duties" under this test, consequently ensuring employers leeway to work
with the vague, undefined phrases represented in the test. Additionally, the
categorical exclusion of speech pursuant to official duties from First
Amendment protection is evidence of the relative paramountcy of
operational efficiency. This primacy is further seen in the Court's refusal
First Amendment protection to public employees' work
to extend
234
product.
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Connick and the plurality's holding
in Waters that potential disruptiveness to operational efficiency was a
sufficient basis for public employers to restrict employee speech or to
discipline employees for speech.235 Moreover, the Court held that public
employers "need a significant degree of control over their employees'
words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient
provision of public services.',,236 According a "significant degree of
control" to employers due to operational efficiency reinforces the primacy
of operational efficiency in the era. To protect operational efficiency, the
Court extended employers the right to scrutinize and control official speech
of public employees thereby ensuring (a) substantive consistency and
clarity; 237 (b)accuracy;238 (c) sound judgment;2 39 and (d) the speech
promotes the employer's mission.24 °
Because Garcetti seemed to afford First Amendment impunity to
employers who discipline employees for speech made pursuant to official
responsibilities,241 the primacy of operational efficiency over MPC speech
continues in the era.

233. The Court's inclination to defer to employers is evident in various portions ofthe opinion.
See generally id.at 1951.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1958.
236. Id. at 1958 (emphasis added).
237. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1961.
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IV. CATEGORIZING SPEECH IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT-FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court's public employment-free speech jurisprudence
consists of a variety of speech. In this part of the Article, the author will
attempt to categorize speech in the public employment-free speech
jurisprudence in a way that would enhance the author's new constitutional
test for the jurisprudence proposed in Part VI of this Article. The various
categories the author uses are: (a) Purely Employee Speech; (b) CitizenEmployee Hybrid Speech; and (c) Purely Citizen Speech.
A. PurelyEmployee Speech
All employee speech that criticizes the employer, solely regards that
particular employee's employment (including criticisms of the employer's
actions, policies, or practices), or other employment contract disputes of
that particular employee with his or her employer should be classified
under this category. Additionally, employee speech that proximately arises
out of the employee's own employment dispute with the employer would
fall under this category, irrespective of its impact on the public or other
government employees, unless the relative importance of the issue to the
public or other government employees substantially outweighs the import
of the speech's proximate relation to the employee's employment dispute
with the employer. In such cases, the speech should be accorded relatively
greater protection than "purely employee speech" and consequently
classified instead under the "citizen-employee hybrid speech."
Examples of "citizen-employee hybrid speech" include an employee's
complaints about the employer's handling of pay or other benefits.
Likewise, in this category would include employee grievances over
working conditions or the employee's employment contract. Speech in the
"purely employee speech" category should be accorded the lowest level of
constitutional protection of the three speech categories.242
In Connick, for example, an assistant district attorney was terminated
after she prepared and distributed to her coworkers a questionnaire
requesting their opinions about office morale, office transfer policy, level
of confidence in supervisors, need for a grievance committee, and
pressures to work in political campaigns.2 ' The Court found only one of

242. Besides, employees who complain about their own employment issues have grievance
procedures in their union contracts or other statutorily-provided grievance procedures for
addressing those issues with their employees. Employees might seek to avail themselves of such
procedures.
243. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140-41 (1983).
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the assistant district attorney's questions in the questionnaire touched on
a matter ofpublic concern: the question about pressure to work on political
campaigns. 2" According to the Court, the other questions were mere
extensions of employment dispute or grievance with the employer.245 As
justification for this distinction, the Court reasoned that speech about
political pressure to work in campaigns might reveal unconstitutional,
official coercion of belief and embody the historical value this country
places on government employment being a function of meritorious rather
than public service .24' This, the Court noted, made the speech about
political pressure to work on campaigns a matter of public concern.247
Unfortunately, the Court failed to articulate any test for determining what
distinguishes the other questions in the questionnaire those concerning
pressure to work on political campaigns. The author's categorization
scheme, however, would change this.
Recall that employee speech that arises out of the employee's
employment dispute with the employer would fall under the "purely
employee speech" category, irrespective of its impact on the public or other
government employees, unless the relative importance of the issue to the
public or other government employees substantially outweighs the import
of the speech's proximate relation to the employee's employment dispute
with his or her employer. The employee, in Connick, prepared the
questionnaire because of her dissatisfaction with her employer's decision
to transfer her:248 in essence, her speech arose out of her dispute with her
employer. Thus, all questions therein should be classified as "purely
employee speech," unless the relative importance of the issue to the public
or other government employees substantially outweighs the import of the
speech's proximate relation to the employee's employment dispute with his
or her employer. Pursuant to this test, employer pressure on employees to
work on political campaigns is of great importance, outweighing the
import of the proximate relationship of the employee's speech to his or her
employment dispute. A close examination of the facts of Connick reveals
that the other issues in the questionnaire have to do with an employee
disgruntled with the employer's decision to transfer her.2 49 Those issues,

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 147-49.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41.
Id.
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therefore, cannot be said to substantially outweigh the proximate
relationship ofthe employee's speech to her grievance about her transfer.250
B. Purely Citizen Speech
Speech of public employees that has absolutely nothing to do with their
employment, made while at work or made in any other capacity, would fall
under the "purely citizen speech" category. It is purely citizen speech
because it is unadulterated by any element of employment. Speech in this
category should be treated like speech of any other citizen who is not a
government employee. In other words, in cases of "purely citizen speech"
the relationship of the government employer to the government employee
for purposes of First Amendment analysis should be treated precisely as
that of the government sovereign to the citizenry, not public employeremployee. Of course, when the employee is not at work, but rather is with
family and friends and other settings having nothing to do with work, the
employee is just a regular citizen. Accordingly, speech in such situations
should be treated for purposes of the First Amendment as speech by any
citizen that is not a government employee.
For citizen speech, as the Supreme Court noted in Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of UnitedStates, Inc. :251

[t]here are categories of communication and certain special
utterances to which the majestic protection of the FirstAmendment
does not extend because they are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
is clearly outweighed by
any benefit that may be derived from them
252
morality.
and
order
in
interest
social
the
25 3 these categories include
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Pickering,
speech that is intentionally false or made with reckless disregard of the
excluded from
truth. Other examples of such citizen speech categorically
254 fighting words; 255
speech;
libelous
include:
First Amendment protection

250. See generally id. at 138.
251. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
252. Id. at 504 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (internal
quotes omitted)).
253. See supra Part III.C "Era of Balancing: Scope."
254. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984); see
also Beauharnais v. Illinois 343 U.S. 250, 255-58 (1952); see also Harte-Hanks, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989).
255. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 504; see also Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72; Cohen v.
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speech inciting riot; 256 obscenity;25 7 and child pornography; 2 8 and speech
presenting "clear and present" danger.2 59
An example of "purely citizen speech" is that of the employee in
Rankin v. McPherson.6 0 In that case, Ardith McPherson, a deputy in the
office of Constable Rankin of Harris County, Texas, was terminated for her
speech.261'According to McPherson, after she heard on an office radio that
someone had tried to assassinate the President of the United States, she
said to Lawrence Jackson, her boyfriend and coworker: "Shoot, if they go
for him[, the President,] again, I hope they get him., 262 Clearly, the
2 163
employee's speech had nothing whatsoever to do with employment;
therefore, it is "purely citizen speech." This kind of speech should be
entitled to the highest level of constitutional protection in the public
employment-free speech jurisprudence, for it is similarly protected for
every citizen who is not a government employee. As the Court indicated
it was not speech that presented a clear and present danger to the
President, 264 so it was not categorically unprotected speech.
C. Citizen-Employee Hybrid Speech
Speech in this category includes speech that is a hybrid of citizen
speech and employee speech. When a public employee speaks out in
criticism of his or her employer's actions, policies, or practices toward any
other government employee while the speaking employee is at work or off
work (irrespective of whether the "other-employee" is an employee of the
speaking employee's government employer or another government
employer); or about the actions, policies, or practices of any government
employer (other than the speaking employee's employer) against any
government employee, the employee's speech falls under the "citizenemployee hybrid speech" category. The "employee speech" component of

California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972).
256. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 504; see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 477-78
(1969).
257. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 504; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85
(1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21, 23 (1973).
258. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 504; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
259. See, e.g., Pennekamp v.Florida, 328 U.S. 331(1946); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48.
For a more extensive discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's examination of unprotected versus
protected categories of speech, see Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 485.
260. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
261. Id. at 380-82.
262. Id. at 381.
263. Seegenerallyid.
264. Id. at 386-87.
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the hybrid comes from the fact that the speech has to do with some issue
related to government employment. The "citizen speech" component of the
hybrid results from the "Good-Samaritan" doctrine that should be in place
to encourage employees to whistleblow about the government-employer
treatment of any other government employee. If such governmentemployer treatment deals with allegations of government-employer
discrimination against the allegedly victimized other-employee on the basis
of race, color, ethnicity, gender, religion, illegitimacy, national origin,
religion, or sexual orientation, then the applicable level of protection
accorded such speech should be dependent on and coextensive with the
level of constitutional protection given citizens with respect to the
protected category in question under the three-tier constitutional
framework.
Likewise, when an employee blows the whistle on his or her own
employer's actions, policies, or practices that have nothing to do with the
actions, policies or practices' application to the employee but rather the
application of those actions, policies or practices to the general public, the
speech should be treated as a "citizen-employee hybrid speech" because it
is based on the "Good-Samaritan" doctrine. As conceived by the author,
the "Good Samaritan" doctrine encourages employees to look out for the
interests of the public and speak out when they find anything that is
detrimental to the general public.265 Akin speech would include speech
exposing employer crimes, fraud or other violations of federal, state, or
local law.
In addition, when a government employee lodges non-work related
complaints about the government's handling of the employee's
employment-related issues, such as criticisms of the Internal Revenue
Service's (IRS) handling of the employee's taxes, it should fall under the
"citizen-employee hybrid speech" category. Though similar to such
criticisms nongovernment employees could make against the IRS or other
government agency, it is not a "purely citizen speech" because it has
elements of employment to it, making it a hybrid.
For teachers, speech criticizing the actions, policies, or practices of the
teacher's employer toward students (irrespective of whether or not those
students are the teacher's own students, and regardless of whether the
speech occurs in a classroom or out ofthe classroom) also would fall under
the "citizen-employee hybrid speech" category. This would be the case

265. Under the author's proposition, the employee who is being a "Good-Samaritan" does not
necessarily have to be "good" in the purest sense of the word; all that is required is that the
employee, by speaking, protects the public or some other person or entity, other than him or herself.
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even if the teacher spoke out about the actions, policies, or practices of
school districts outside the teacher's own school district, since the
speaker's employment as a teacher introduces an element of employment
into the speech, taking it out of the scope of the "purely citizen speech."
Moreover, since the speech is in the "Good-Samaritan" role, speaking
out for students, the speech has an element of "citizen speech"; this
mixture makes it "citizen-employee hybrid speech." Examples include
teacher speech about: (1) the unwarranted severity of corporal punishment
imposed on students; 266 (2) handling of sexual misconduct against
students; 267 (3) lowered academic standards; 268 (4) handling of student
alcohol use; 269 (5) inappropriate alteration of student grades; and (6) other
grading improprieties. 27 0 However, some teacher speech must be afforded
greater constitutional protection and judicial scrutiny. In cases where the
teacher alleges discrimination by the employer against students on the basis
of race, color, ethnicity, gender, religion, illegitimacy, national origin,
religion, or sexual orientation, relatively greater constitutional protection
and judicial scrutiny coextensive with that discussed supra under the
"purely employee speech" category should apply.
Another example of "citizen-employee hybrid speech" was addressed
in Mount Healthy, where the employee spoke to a radio station about a
dress code that affected all teachers at a public school. 27 ' The dress code
was generally applicable and based on efforts to influence the inflow of
taxpayer funds to the school.27 2 In essence, it could be said that the teacher
upheld the "Good-Samaritan" role with respect to the public and his fellow
teachers, beyond merely the employee's own employment. In Perry, the
teacher's speech advocating structural change from a two to a four-year
institution was not related to the employer's actions, policies, or practices
applicable to the teacher's own employment.273
Similarly, in Madison Joint School DistrictNo. 8,274 the employee's
speech dealt with the implementation of a "fair share" clause 275 generally

266. Bowman v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 723 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1983).
267. Cromley v. Bd. of Educ. of Lockport Township High Sch., 17 F.3d 1059 (7th Cir. 1994).
268. Storlazzi v. Bakey, 894 F. Supp. 494, 501 (D. Mass. 1995).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281-82 (1977).
272. Id.
273. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 594 (1972).
274. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
275. A fair share clause/agreement is a provision included in a collective bargaining agreement
obligating all employees irrespective of union membership to contribute to union dues. Madison
Joint School District No. 8, 429 U.S. at 169. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(1)(f) describes the fair share
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applicable to all teachers in the school district.276 Again, this extended
beyond solely the employee's own personal employment issues for the
teacher was in the "Good-Samaritan" role on behalf of other teachers in the
school district. In Pickering, the employee's speech criticizing his
employer's handling of various bond initiatives and the relative allocation
of funds to athletics dealt with employment; 7 thus, the "employee speech"
component of the hybrid. The "citizen speech" component comes from the
fact that the employee's speech extended beyond his or her personal
employment issues. Similarly, the speech in Pickering about the school
board's handling of bond initiatives and its allocation of taxpayer funds
protects the public's interest in the school board and the appropriation of
taxes, inter alia.278 Since the speech in Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District27 9 was employment-related and involved
allegations of racial discrimination,28 ° it is an example of "citizenemployee hybrid speech"; however, it should be entitled to the relatively
greater constitutional protection and equal to the judicial scrutiny applied
to government actions based on race.281
Garcetti is another example of "citizen-employee hybrid speech." In
that case, the employee was allegedly retaliated against for his speech
conveying to his employer serious misrepresentations in an affidavit used

clause/agreement as follows:
Fair-share agreement means an agreement between a municipal employer and a
labor organization under which all or any of the employees in the collective
bargaining unit are required to pay their proportionate share of the cost of the
collective bargaining process and contract administration measured by the amount
of dues uniformly required of all members. Such an agreement shall contain a
provision requiring the employer to deduct the amount of dues as certified by the
labor organization from the earnings of the employees affected by said agreement
and to pay the amount so deducted to the labor organization.
Id. (internal quotes omitted).
276. Id. at 169-73.
277. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564-68 (1968).
278. See generallyPickering, 391 U.S. at 563.
279. 439 U.S. 410 (1979). Givhan involved a case where a black teacher complained to her
employer about policies she found discriminatory in purpose and effect. See id. at 411-13. The
Court found the whistleblowing speech about racial discrimination to be an inherent matter of
public concern and, therefore, protected speech under the First Amendment. See id. at 415-16.
280. Id. at 411-13.
281. See Joseph 0. Oluwole, PickeringBalancingTest andPublic Employment-FreeSpeech
Jurisprudence:The Approachof the FederalCircuit CourtsofAppeals, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 133, 13839 (2008) (discussing the Court's finding of race as a matter inherently of public concern in
Givhan).
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to obtain a warrant and recommending dismissal of the case.282 Since the
employee's speech deals with an employment-related issue and also has
elements in the public interest-obtaining affidavits using serious
misrepresentations 283-the employee's speech is a hybrid. Other examples
of "citizen-employee hybrid speech" include public employee's speech
about actions of their employers such as: politically-motivated transfer of
a fellow teacher to a distant educational outpost;28 4 mismanagement 2of
86
taxpayer funds; 285 violations of the state's open-meetings

law;

of documents; 287 school-

suppression of evidence and fraudulent alteration
imposed limitations on free speech; 288 failure to implement programs for
emotionally and behaviorally impaired students; 289 inadequate funding of
kindergarten program; 290 favoritism in grading athletes; 291 race-based
discipline of students; 292 and exchange of grades for sex.2 93
V. A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL TEST FOR ANALYZING CASES IN THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT-FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court's public employment-free speech jurisprudence has
evolved through interpretations and applications that have resulted in
increasingly pro-employer leanings in the Pickeringbalancing test-a test
originally intended to balance countervailing interests of the employer and
the employee.294 To provide better consideration of the countervailing
interests of the public employer and that of the public employee, the author
proposes a three-tier review framework for the categories of public
employee speech. As legal scholar Ashutosh Bhagwat 295 aptly stated in

282. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955-56 (2006).
283. Id.
284. Wichert v. Walter, 606 F. Supp. 1516, 1517 (D.N.J. 1985).
285. Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 31 F.3d 183, 186 (4th Cir. 1994); Stroman v. Colleton
County Sch. Dist., 981 F.2d 152, 154 (4th Cir. 1992).
286. Dishnow v. Sch. Dist. of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194 (7th Cir. 1996).
287. Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980).
288. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Colo. 2000).
289. Wytrwal v. Saco Sch. Bd., 70 F.3d 165 (1st Cir. 1995).
290. Lifton v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 290 F. Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
291. Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1989).
292. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 2004).
293. Coats, 890 F.2d at 728, cert. denied, 498 U.S. at 821.
294. See supra Part III.D (discussing "Era of OE > MPC Speech").

295. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 CAL. L. REv. 297
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another context, I believe readers must keep in mind that
[n]o analysis, including the framework I propose, can provide
precise answers to all difficult questions. Indeed, the search for a
universal test is partly responsible for the current doctrine's
disarray. What I present here is a broad and hopefully useful
framework, but actual analysis must proceed right-by-right and
case-by-case.296
Hopefully, however, by taking account of the different categories of
employee speech, the government as employer has greater leeway to
accommodate operational efficiency.
The test the author proposes is based on the trifurcated review
framework the Supreme Court employs in its analysis of Equal Protection
cases.29 7 The author introduces a brief history of the Equal Protection
Clause298 three-tier framework in this part of the Article. The history will
provide context to the three-tier framework on which the author's proposal
is based. In the next section, the author then sets forth the Equal Protection
Clause three-tier framework. The final section presents the framework as
modified by the author for the public employment-free speech
jurisprudence, with the applicable categories of public employee speech.
A. History of the EqualProtection Clause Three-Tier Framework
There are three tiers of review for the Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence: (a) rational basis; (b) intermediate scrutiny; and (c) strict
scrutiny.299 A brief historical overview of each follows.
Under rational basis standard of review, courts defer to government
action as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
Rational basis is the oldest of the three tiers of review. Commentator

(1997).
296. Id. at 326-27 (internal quotes omitted).
297. For an extensive discussion ofthe three-tier framework, see generally id. See alsoSanford
Levinson, Tiers of Scrutiny--From Strict through Rational Bases-and the Future of Interests:
Commentary on Fiss andLinde, 55 ALB. L. REv. 745 (1992).
298. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "No
State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the Equal Protection Clause is applicable to the federal government via the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
299. Bhagwat, supra note 295, at 303.
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Robert W. Bennett3 °° credits the origin of rational basis review to as far
back as 1897.301 At the time, the Court often deferred to government action
and legislation, choosing instead to give great leeway to the political
branches of the government: a laissezfaireapproach. The Court essentially
deferred to state exercises of police power, as long as the exercise entailed
efforts to protect the morals, health, or safety of the public. This was
effectively rational basis review, though not in the exact form and rhetoric
as the test is articulated today.30 2 In fact, today's form of rational basis
review traces back to the:
Court's decision during the mid- 1930s to withdraw from the highly
interventionist posture taken in Lochner v. New York ... [, and the
decision] has come to embody the notion that most legislation is
entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality and that, all
things considered, the judicial invalidation of social and economic
legislation should be an exceptional event.30 3
Lochner v. New York 3° ushered in a period known as the Lochner era
(1905-1937), a period typified by ambitious judicial review of government
action. During this era, the Supreme Court invalidated approximately 200
statutes 3 5 and made it a frequent practice to second-guess legislative policy
judgments.30 6
In Lochner, the Supreme Court struck down a New York state labor
statute that prohibited any bakery or confectionery from requiring or
permitting its employees to work over 60 hours in any one week or over 10
hours in any day. 3 7 The plaintiff in the case had been mistakenly indicted

300. Robert

W.

Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in ConstitutionalLaw: Judicial Review and

DemocraticTheory, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1049 (1979).
301. Id. Specifically, Bennett credits the origins of the rational basis standard of review to
Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Railway v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
302. See generallyLochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
303. Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection,RationalBasisReview, andtheImpact ofCleburne
Living Center,Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 603 (2000). For early examples of cases articulating rational
basis review, see Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City RR. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35,43 (1910);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bd.
of Improvement, 274 U.S. 387 (1927); State of Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392
(1927); Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935).
304. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
305. Michael J. Klarman, An InterpretiveHistory of Modern Equal Protection,90 MICH. L.
REv. 213, 221 (1991).
306. Id. at 219.
307. Lochner, 198 U.S. at45.
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for violating the statute. °8 Breaking from its tradition of deference to
legislative policyjudgments that had characterized the pre-Lochner era, the
Court ruled that the statute interfered with the right to contract of
employers and employees suijuris, a "part of the liberty of the individual
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution."30 9
The Court made it a requirement of judicial review under Equal
Protection and Substantive Due Process jurisprudence that the following
question be answered: "Is this a fair, reasonableand appropriate exercise
of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable,unnecessaryand
arbitraryinterference with the right of the individual."3 ' This kind of
scrutiny was clearly a departure from the prior laissez faire approach.
While the Court noted that its goal is not to substitute "the judgment of the
court for that of the legislature," the Court made clear that courts still have
the determinative voice.3 ' The Court went on to invalidate the labor statute
in the case, declaring that "[t]here is no reasonableground for interfering
with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determining the
hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker."3" 2 The grounds proffered by
the state of New York in justification for the statute were deemed not to
serve the "safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public."3'13
The approach Lochner heralded for judicial review of government
action under the Equal Protection Clause could be grasped by reading the
following passage:
It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail-the
power of the state to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty
of person and freedom of contract. The mere assertion that the
subject relates, though but in a remote degree, to the public health,
does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have
a more directrelation,as a means to an end, and the end itself must
be appropriateand legitimate,before an act can be held to be valid
which interferes with the general right of an individual.3"4

308. Id. at 52.
309. Id. at 53-54.
310. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
311. Id. at 57 ("But the question would still remain: Is it within the police power of the state?
and that question must be answered by the court.") (emphasis added).
312. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added).
313. Id.at 53, 58.
314. Id. at 57-58 (emphasis added).
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In other words, a means-end scrutiny is required. No longer would "mere
' be "saved
meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual"315
from condemnation by the claim that they are passed in the exercise of the
police power.131 6 Emphasizing the change of era from one of deference to
Lochner's, the Court stated that' "the limit of the police power has been
reached and passed in this case. 317
The Lochner era lasted until 1937 when President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt threatened the Court with the legendary "Court packing plan."
Pursuant to its Lochner era activism, the Court struck down various New
Deal legislations,318 prompting President Roosevelt to propose the Court
packing plan. Then in 193 8, the Court officially abandoned its Lochnerera
approach in United States v. CaroleneProducts Co.,319 holding that

315. Id. at 59.
316. Id. at 61.
317. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58.
318. "New Deal" refers to the various plans President Franklin Roosevelt proposed for
economic recovery, relief, and reform during the Great Depression, after the stock market crashed
on October 29, 1929 (also known as "Black Tuesday"). The U.S. Supreme Court struck down many
of the plans as unconstitutional. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 in United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1 (1936); Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936); National Industrial Recovery Act in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) and Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Railroad
Retirement Act in R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); see also Humphrey's Ex'r
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). President Roosevelt proposed the Judiciary Reorganization
Bill (1937), which suggested adding to the nine Justices on the Court. Specifically, the bill
proposed adding one additional Justice for each Justice then over seventy years. Since 1869,
Congress statutorily had set the number of Justices on the Supreme Court at nine. This bill would
have increased the number of Justices on the Court at the time to fifteen, giving President Roosevelt
the opportunity to add six new Justices. The Justices opposed to the New Deal were known as the
"Four Horsemen," conservative members ofthe Court including: James Clark McReynolds, George
Sutherland, Pierce Butler, and Willis Van Devanter. On the other side were the "Three
Musketeers," made up of the liberal members of the Court: Justices Louis Brandeis, Benjamin
Cardozo, and Harlan Stone. Chief Justice Evans Hughes and Justice Owen Roberts were the swing
votes, with Justice Owens Roberts often aligning with the Four Horsemen, and the Chief Justice
with the Three Musketeers, making for a 5-4 majority against the New Deal. Ostensibly due to the
threat of President Roosevelt's "Court packing plan," Justice Roberts switched to vote with the
Three Musketeers and Chief Justice Hughes in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), thus upholding the constitutionality of a state minimum wage law. This was the "switch in
time that saved nine." In the same year, Justice Van Devanter (a member of the Four Horsemen)
retired, and Justice Hugo Black replaced him on the Court. This shift helped fuel the decline of the
Lochner era and a Court more friendly to President Roosevelt's New Deal. See also United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (affirming the end of the
Lochner era).
319. CaroleneProds. Co., 304 U.S. at 144.
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[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators.32 °
"'
This is the origin of the modem form of rational basis review.32
Under strict scrutiny standard of review, to pass constitutional muster,
government action must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest.322 The strict scrutiny standard of review has it origins
in Carolene Products' Famous Footnote Four. After establishing the
rational basis standard of review as the standard of review for social and
economic legislation, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, writing for the Court,
added in Footnote Four: "There may be narrowerscope for operation of
the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to
be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
'
embraced within the Fourteenth."323

320.
321.
322.
323.

Id.at 153.
See supra text accompanying note 303.
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
CaroleneProds. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added). Footnote Four fully states:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those ofthe first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. See Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369, 370, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 536, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73
A.L.R. 1484; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949, decided
March 28, 1938. It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial
scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are
most other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, see Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536,47 S.Ct. 446,71 L.Ed. 759; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S.
73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984, 88 A.L.R. 458; on restraints upon the
dissemination of information, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-714, 718720, 722, 51 S.Ct. 625,630,632,633, 75 L.Ed. 1357; Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; on
interferences with political organizations, see Stromberg v. California, supra, 283
U.S. 359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R. 1484; Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 47 S.Ct. 655, 71 L.Ed. 1108; Whitney v. California, 274
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While Footnote Four did not mention the phrase "strict scrutiny," it
implied strict scrutiny through references to "more exacting judicial
scrutiny," and "more searching judicial inquiry, ' ' 1 24 introducing a two-tier
judicial review process: (a) rational basis; and (b) strict scrutiny. In other
words, as the Court went from the Lochner era's highly interventionist
posture3 25 to the non-interventionist posture articulated in Carolene
Products,the Court felt compelled to add Footnote Four to forewarn that
not all government action would be entitled to the non-interventionist
posture.326 Footnote Four intimates that a standard of review, which
essentially amounts to strict scrutiny, would likely be applicable to
legislation that: (1) appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition
of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments; 327 (2)
restricts those political processes, such as the right to vote, political
organizations, peaceable assembly, dissemination of information, which
can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation; 328 or (3) is directed at discrete and insular minorities such as
religious, national, or racial minorities.329

U.S. 357,373-378, 47 S.Ct. 641,647,649,71 L.Ed. 1095;Hemdonv. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066; and see Holmes, J., in Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 673, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138; as to prohibition of
peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365, 57 S.Ct. 255,
260, 81 L.Ed. 278. Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into
the review of statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468, or national, Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,43 S.Ct. 625,67 L.Ed. 1042,29 A.L.R. 1446; Bartels v.
Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 43 S.Ct. 628, 67 L.Ed. 1047; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273
U.S. 284, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646, or racial minorities. Nixon v. Herndon,
supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra. We also do not inquire whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which seriously tends
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a more searching judicial inquiry.
Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428, 4 L.Ed. 579; South
Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct.
510, 82 L.Ed. 734, decided February 14, 1938, note 2, and cases cited.
Id. at 153 n.4.
324. See id.
325. See Saphire, supranote 303 (describing the highly interventionist posture of the Court).
326. See generally Carolene Prods.Co., 304 U.S. at 144.
327. See supra text accompanying note 323.
328. See supra text accompanying note 323.
329. See supra text accompanying note 323. For a more extensive discussion ofFootnote Four,
see Peter Linzer, The CaroleneProductsFootnote andthe PreferredPositionofIndividualRights:
Louis Lusky and John HartEly vs. HarlanFiske Stone, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 277 (1995).
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The Court first used the phrase "strict scrutiny" in Skinner v. State of
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson.3 30 In that case, an Oklahoma state statute

provided that any person convicted of three felonies involving moral
" ' The petitioner-defendant in the
turpitude could be sexually sterilized.33
case had been convicted of three felonies involving moral turpitude:
stealing chickens once, robbery with firearms twice. 332 The petitioner
appealed the Supreme Court of Oklahoma's decision, which affirmed the
lower court ruling that vasectomy be performed on him.3 33 In finding the
statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court stated that "strict scrutiny of
the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest
unwittingly or otherwise invidious discriminations are made against groups
or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just
and equal laws.

33 4

Building on Footnote Four, in Korematsu v. UnitedStates, 33 the Court
applied strict scrutiny to "suspect classification:" "all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It
336
is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.,
33 7 the Court,
Similarly, in McLaughlin v. Florida,
articulating an early

rendition of the strict scrutiny standard, held that racial classifications are
constitutionally suspect. 33 8 This rendition stated that laws with invidious
racial discrimination "even though enacted pursuant to a valid state
interest, bear[] a heavy burden of justification."' ' These laws would be
ruled unconstitutional unless they are "necessary, and not merely rationally
related to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy. ' 34 ° According

330. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
331. Id. at 536-37.
332. Id. at 537.
333. Id. at 536.
334. Id. at 541. For a critique of strict scrutiny, see, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedomof Speech,
PermissibleTailoringand TranscendingStrictScrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2417(1996); Gunther,
supra note 112.
335. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
336. Id. at 216 (emphasis added); reference therein to "most rigid scrutiny" is a reference to
"strict scrutiny."
337. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
338. Id. at 192; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
339. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added).
340. Id. The requirement of "necessary" rather than "compelling" as is currently required
under the strict scrutiny standard was an early articulation ofthe strict scrutiny standard of review.
The Court as a whole first articulated the "compelling" interest requirement in NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson,357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958), according Justice Frankfurter's language in Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262, 265 (1957), which introduced the "compelling interest"
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to the Court, "the traditional indicia of suspectness [are as follows]: the
class is... saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the
3 41
majoritarian political process.
In further expanding the strict scrutiny doctrine, the Court, in Skinner,
held that the right to marriage and procreation are fundamental rights,
infringement of which is subject to strict scrutiny.3 42 In Graham v.
Richardson,343 the Court extended strict scrutiny to classifications based on
resident alienage.344 Similarly, in Shapiro, the Court recognized the
fundamental right to interstate travel. 345 The Court noted that "moving
from State to State or to the District of Columbia... [is] a constitutional
right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest, is unconstitutional. 346 The following rights were also recognized
as fundamental rights: voting; 347 right of free association; 348 and criminal
appeals.349 Additionally, in Sherbertv. Verner,35 ° the Court held that strict
scrutiny was applicable to infringement on the free exercise of religion.35'
"Compelling state interest" first appeared in Sweezy v. State of New
Hampshire.352 In Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, he stated that:
"the subordinating interest of the State must be compelling."35 3 In a later
decision, the Court required that under the strict scrutiny standard of

requirement; then subsequently in Bates v. City ofLittle Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
341. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
342. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942).
343. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
344. Id.at 371-72.
345. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630-31.
346. Id. at 634; accord United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966); Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 48-49 (1867).
347. YickXWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370 (1886); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62
(1964); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,667-68 (1966); Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969)(referring to "close and exacting examination").
348. Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Alabama, ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
349. Gunther, supra note 112, at 8-9.
350. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
351. Id. at 403, 406-07.
352. Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
353. Id. at 262, 265.
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review, government 354action must be narrowly tailored to serve the
government interest.
Esteemed constitutional law scholar, Gunther, describes strict scrutiny
' and rational basis review
as sometimes "strict in theory and fatal in fact"355
as "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact., 356 At one end of
the constitutional review spectrum lies strict scrutiny with its concern for
protecting core constitutional rights while at the other end is rational basis
review with its inclination for deference to the legislative and executive
arms of government. There had to be a middle ground; and in its search for
a middle ground for those cases that do not lie at either end of the
spectrum, the Court developed intermediate scrutiny.357 In fact, in Craigv.
Boren,358 Justice Powell wrote in his concurring opinion:
As is evident from our opinions, the Court has had difficulty in
agreeing upon a standard of equal protection analysis that can be
applied consistently to the wide variety of legislative classifications.
There are valid reasons for dissatisfaction with the "two-tier"
approach that has been prominent in the Court's decisions in the
past decade.359

354. 319 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1943); see references therein to "narrowly drawn." For other early
articulations of the strict scrutiny standard of review, see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118
(1970); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,336 (1972); see also Greg Robinson & Toni Robinson,
Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese Americans and the Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 68 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2005) (a disquisition on the origins of strict scrutiny). Other cases indicate
that substituting terminology for the "narrow tailoring" requirement may be the "least restrictive
means." See, e.g., Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("a
state may justify an in road on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of
achieving some compelling state interest"); see also Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); accord San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
355. Gunther, supra note 112, at 8.
356. Id.
357. Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 298, 319 (1998).
358. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
359. Id. at 210 n.*. Justice Powell was reluctant to characterize the intermediate scrutiny
standard as a middle-tier, however, noting that:
our decision today will be viewed by some as a "middle-tier" approach. While I
would not endorse that characterization and would not welcome a further
subdividing of equal protection analysis, candor compels the recognition that the
relatively deferential "rational basis" standard ofreview normally applied takes on
a sharper focus when we address a gender-based classification. So much is clear
from our recent cases.
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In 1972, Gunther observed "mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier
formulations of the Warren Court's equal protection doctrine. ,361
Expressing optimism about the development of a "middle-tier," Gunther
declared that "[t]he Court is prepared to use the clause as an interventionist
tool without 61resorting to the strict scrutiny language of the new equal
3
protection.
Under the intermediate scrutiny standard of review, to pass
constitutional muster, government action must be substantially related to
an important government interest.3 62 The origin of the intermediate scrutiny
standard of review can be traced to Craig.3 63 In that case, the Court
invalidated a state statute that forbade the sale of nonintoxicating 3.2%
beer to males under age 21 and females under age 18." The plaintiffs
challenged the statute as an unconstitutional gender-based discrimination,
because it denied males between the ages of 18-20 the equal protection of
the law. 365 Articulating the intermediate scrutiny standard, the Court stated
that: "classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
'
objectives." 366
The Court explained that the statute in the case did not
satisfy the intermediate scrutiny standard of review and consequently
violated the Equal Protection Clause.36 7

Id.
360. Gunther, supra note 112, at 12.
361. Id.
362. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
363. Craig,429 U.S. at 190. Actually, the Court articulated the substance of the intermediate
scrutiny standard earlier than Craig.See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
However, Craigwas the first case in which the phrase "intermediate scrutiny" was used to describe
and label the substance of the standard. Craig,429 U.S. at 217.
364. Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 197.
367. Id. at 204. Specifically, the Court held that:
We accept for purposes of discussion the District Court's identification of the
objective underlying... [the statute] as the enhancement of traffic safety. Clearly,
the protection of public health and safety represents an important function of state
and local governments. However, appellees' statistics in our view cannot support
the conclusion that the gender-based distinction closely serves to achieve that
objective and therefore the distinction cannot under Reed [Reedv. Reed] withstand
equal protection challenge.
Id. at 199-200 (emphasis added); accordReed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Besides, the Court
added:
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Intermediate scrutiny has been extended to classifications based on
gender368 and illegitimacy.369 Additionally, in Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v.
FederalCommunicationsCommission,37 ° the Court held that benign racial
classifications by the federal government (e.g., affirmative action or other
classifications that favor minorities or disfavor whites) are subject to
intermediate scrutiny. The Court held that:
[B] enign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even if
those measures are not 'remedial' in the sense of being designed to
compensate victims of past governmental or societal
discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent that
they serve important governmental objectives within the power of

It is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state officials to be
well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique. But this merely
illustrates that proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious
business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that
underlies the Equal Protection Clause. Suffice to say that the showing offered by
the appellees does not satisfy us that sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for
the regulation of drinking and driving. In fact, when it is further recognized that
Oklahoma's statute prohibits only the selling of 3.2% beer to young males and not
their drinking the beverage once acquired (even after purchase by their 18-20year-old female companions), the relationship between gender and traffic safety
becomes far too tenuous to satisfy Reed's requirement that the gender-based
difference be substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective. We
hold, therefore, that under Reed, Oklahoma's 3.2% beerstatute invidiously
discriminates against males 18-20 years of age.
Craig, 429 U.S. at 204 (footnote omitted).
368. Craig,429 U.S. at 204. See also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982) (articulating "exceedingly persuasive justification" as an alternative formulation of the
intermediate scrutiny standard).
Our decisions also establish that the party seeking to uphold a statute that
classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden ofshowing
an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification. The burden is met
only by showing at least that the classification serves important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
369. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988). For a broad exposition on intermediate scrutiny,
see Wexler, supra note 357.
370. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those
objectives. 37 '
The Court distinguished this decision in City ofRichmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.,37 2 which held

that racial classifications by state and local governments

are subject to strict scrutiny.373 Specifically, the Court noted that City of
Richmond only governed benign racial classifications by states and
municipalities, not congressionally -adopted race-conscious benign
classifications.374 In support of this reasoning, the Court cited its decision
in Fullilove v. Klutznick,375 reviewing a federal affirmative action plan, as
authority for the difference in the standard of scrutiny applicable to states
(and municipalities) versus the federal government. The Court stated that,
"much of the language and reasoning in Croson reaffirmed the lesson of
Fullilove that race-conscious classifications adopted by Congress to
address racial and ethnic discrimination are subject to a different standard
than such classifications prescribed by state and local governments. 376 In
essence, the Court held that Congress had greater leeway "to identify and
redress the effects of society-wide discrimination" than states and
municipalities in the adoption of race-conscious classifications.377
However, inAdarandConstructors,Inc. v. Pena,378 the Court overruled
Metro Broadcasting,Inc., holding that all racial classifications (including
benign racial classifications), whether utilized by the federal, state, or local
governments, are subject to strict scrutiny rather than intermediate
scrutiny.379 In addition, the Court ruled that to the extent that Fullilove held
that federal classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than
strict scrutiny, Fullilove is no longer controlling.380

371. Id.at 564-65 (footnote omitted).
372. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
373. Id. at 493-94.
374. Metro Broad, 497 U.S. at 565.
375. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
376. Metro Broad, 497 U.S. at 565.
377. Id.(internal quotes and citations omitted).
378. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
379. Id. at 227.
380. Id. at 235. Recall, City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), already held that racial
classifications by state and local governments are subject to strict scrutiny; Adarand Constructors,
Inc., 515 U.S. 200 (1995), thus brought the federal government within the ambit of strict scrutiny.
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B. Equal Protection Clause Three-TierFramework
There are three-tiers to the judicial standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause: (a) strict scrutiny; (b) intermediate scrutiny; and (c)
rational basis review.
The first step in determining what level of scrutiny is applicable in a
given case is ascertaining whether the government classification involves
a suspect (or quasi-suspect) classification or a fundamental right.38 ' If there
is a suspect classification or fundamental right, then strict scrutiny applies,
and if there is a quasi-suspect classification, then intermediate scrutiny
applies.382 Otherwise, rational basis review is applicable.
1. Strict Scrutiny
The strict scrutiny standard of review is only applied when government
action results in a classification that "interferes with a fundamental right,
or discriminates against a 'suspect class.' 383 When strict scrutiny applies,
the government action is presumed unconstitutional. To pass constitutional
muster under the strict scrutiny standard of review and thus overcome the
presumption, the burden is on the government to show that
the
38 4
classification is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.
The test for determining if a right is fundamental is: whether the right
is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution-"implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty., 385 The Supreme Court has recognized

381. For application of strict scrutiny to fundamental rights, see, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Police Dep't of
the City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638
(1969). For application of strict scrutiny to suspect classifications, see, e.g., AdarandConstructors,
515 U.S. at 227; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,371-72 (1971); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Loving v. Commonwealth of Va., 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964). For application of intermediate scrutiny to quasi-suspect
classifications, see, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982).
382. The Court has refused to add to the list of suspect classifications subject to srict scrutiny.
383. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 457 (1988).
384. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Stated another way, the strict scrutiny standard
of review requires that government classifications affecting a suspect class or a fundamental right
must serve a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest. See,
e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
385. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937); accord San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist., 411 U.S. at 33-34. For example, in San Antonio Independent School District, the Court
stated:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the
name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering
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the following rights as being fundamental voting in federal and state
elections;186 interstate travel;387 marriage and procreation;.. free
association; 389 privacy; 390 and criminal appeals.39 Suspect classifications
for purposes of strict scrutiny jurisprudence include: race, ethnicity, and
national origin;3 92 and resident alienage.3 93
2. Intermediate Scrutiny
The intermediate scrutiny standard of review is applied when
government action results in a classification that discriminates against a
quasi-suspect class.3 94 As with strict scrutiny, when intermediate scrutiny

whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the
relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing.
Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right
to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
386. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370 (1886); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62
(1964); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,665 (1966); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). Note that in Sailors v. Bd. of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967),
the Court held that there is no fundamental right to vote in local elections, affirming the holding in
Reynolds, that the fundamental right is limited to federal and state elections.
387. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966); Mem'l
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974). Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476
U.S. 898, 904-05 n.4 (1986) (holding that: "regardless of the label we place on our analysis-right
to migrate or equal protection--once we find a burden on the right to migrate the standard ofreview
is the same. Laws which burden that right must be necessary to further a compelling state interest.").
388. Skinner v. State of Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978).
389. Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Alabama, ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 489 (1958).
390. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
391. Gunther, supra note 112, at 8-9.
392. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1995); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944);
Loving v. Commonwealth ofVa., 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196
(1964); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,432 (1984); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,310
(1879).
393. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219-20 (1984); Graham,403 U.S. at 372; In
re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973). As a general matter, "a state law that discriminates on the
basis of alienage can be sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial scrutiny. In order to
withstand strict scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive
means available." Bernal,467 U.S. at 219-20 (footnote omitted).
394. Quasi-suspect classes are classifications that have great constitutional import, which
entitles them to greater scrutiny than rational basis, but is not as strict scrutiny, which suspect
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applies, the government action is presumed unconstitutional.395 To pass
constitutional muster under the intermediate scrutiny standard of review
and thus overcome the presumption, the burden is on the government to
show that the classification is substantially related to an important
government interest.396 Articulated in other words by the Court,
intermediate scrutiny requires the government to establish an "exceedingly
' for the classification.
persuasive justification"397
Intermediate scrutiny is the middle-tier scrutiny between strict scrutiny
and rational basis review: the "substantially related" requirement is less
stringent than the "narrowly tailored" requirement of strict scrutiny but
more stringent than the "rationally related" requirement of rational basis
review. Consequently, the "important interest" requirement is less stringent
than the "compelling interest" requirement of strict scrutiny but more
stringent than the "legitimate interest" required under rational basis
review.398 The Court has recognized gender399 and illegitimacy as quasisuspect classes.400
classifications are entitled. See generally, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
395. See generally Guest, 383 U.S. 745; Adarand Constructors,Inc. 515 U.S. at 200.
396. Craig, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
397. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981).
398. See generallyRodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.
399. Craig,429 U.S. at 190, 197; Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724 (1982).
400. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68,72 (1968); Clarkv. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988). Levy
was the first case to require that classifications discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy be
scrutinized under a greater or heightened standard than rational basis, because of the "intimate,
familial relationship." Levy, 391 U.S. at 71. The Court reasoned:
Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely because of his birth out
ofwedlock? He certainly is subject to all the responsibilities of a citizen, including
the payment of taxes and conscription under the Selective Service Act. How under
our constitutional regime can he be denied correlative rights which other citizens
enjoy? ...We conclude that it is invidious to discriminate against them when no
action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was
done... We can say with Shakespeare: "Why bastard, wherefore base? When my
dimensions are as well compact, My mind as generous, and my shape as true, As
honest madam's issue? Why brand they us With base? with baseness? bastardy?
base, base?" King Lear, Act I, Scene 2.
Id. at 71-72 (all footnotes omitted except footnote 6). However, Clark v. Jeter was the first case to
bring illegitimacy within the ambit of the intermediate scrutiny standard. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
Prior to Clark, the Court held in City of Cleburne v. CleburneLiving Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441
(1985), that "[b]ecause illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control and bears no relation to the
individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society, official discriminations resting on that
characteristic are also subject to somewhat heightened review" (internal quotes and citations
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3. Rational Basis Review
The rational basis standard of review is applied when government
action results in a classification that does not involve a suspect (or quasisuspect) class or a fundamental right.40 ' Unlike strict scrutiny and

intermediate scrutiny, under rational basis review, the government action
is presumed constitutional.4 °2 To pass constitutional muster under the
rational basis standard of review and thus overcome the presumption, the
burden is on the plaintiff" 3 to show that the classification is not rationally
related to a legitimate government interest.' ° Thus, rational basis embodies

a very deferential judicial posture toward government action.40 5
Under rational basis, a government classification will be upheld "if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification." 406 It will withstand rational basis
review, even if the classification is "based on rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data."4 °7

omitted). The Court explained that a heightened standard of review was applicable because such
"restrictions will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a
legitimate state interest." City of Cleburne,473 U.S. at 441 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
The "substantially related" is in the language of the intermediate scrutiny as currently articulated
by the Court, while the "legitimate state interest" is part of the lexicon of rational basis review.
401. See generallyRodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.
402. See generallyFed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
403. See id. at 315 ("those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the
burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support it") (internal quotes omitted).
404. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) ("A century of
Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the
application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State's system be
shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.").
405. Note that sometimes the "rationally related" requirement of the rational basis means-end
scrutiny is also characterized as a "reasonably related" requirement. See, e.g., U.S. Railroad
Retirement Boardv. Fritz,449 U.S. 166, 184 (1980).
406. Fed. Comm'ns Comm'n, 508 U.S. at 313.
407. Id. at 315. The Court also has articulated:
[t]hat a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not
constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the
law, it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from
proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.
Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910). The Court stated:

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 19

Of the three-tier Equal Protection standards of review, rational basis is
the least stringent. 408 As the Court noted in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co. 409:
A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend
against... [the Equal Protection Clause] merely because it is not
made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in
When the classification in such a law is called
some inequality ....
into question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the
law was enacted must be assumed . . . One who assails the
classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that
rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially
it does not
410
arbitrary.
41
In his dissenting opinion, in U.S. RailroadRetirementBoardv. Fritz, '
Justice Brennan articulated the steps for rational basis review: "When
faced with a challenge to a legislative classification under the rational-basis
test, the court should ask, first, what the purposes of the statute are, and,
second, whether the classification is rationally related to achievement of
those purposes. '"412

1.The equal-protection clause of the 14' Amendment does not take from the state
the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of
a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is
without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that
clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in
practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is
called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must
be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is
essentially arbitrary.
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
408. Gunther, supra note 112, at 8 (describing rational basis as "minimal scrutiny in theory
and virtually none in fact"). For a disquisition on the rational basis standard of review, see Gunther,
supra note 112.
409. Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 61.
410. Id.at 78-79.
411. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
412. Id.at 184.
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FIGURE

1: THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
THREE-TIER FRAMEWORK

The above is an overview of the three-tier framework used in the Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence. The author's proposed constitutional test
for analyzing cases in the public employment-free speech jurisprudence is
based on this framework.
C. Proposalof a Three-Tier Frameworkfor the Public EmploymentFree Speech Jurisprudence
This section presents the Equal Protection three-tier framework for
cases in the public employment-free speech jurisprudence. For this
purpose, the author will couple each tier of the framework with a category
of public employee speech taxonomy catalogued above: purely citizen
speech; citizen-employee hybrid speech; and purely employee speech.
Since the proposed test is based on the trifurcated review framework
the U.S. Supreme Court uses in the analysis of Equal Protection cases, it
is unnecessary to restate the entire three-tier framework of the Equal
Protection Clause. Therefore, this section will only present the basic
elements of each tier that are necessary to set forth the proposed test.
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1. Strict Scrutiny-- "PurelyCitizen Speech"
Employee speech that has nothing to do with their employment should
be classified as "purely citizen speech."'"3 Such speech should be entitled
to the full protection of the First Amendment as speech of citizens who are
not government employees.
Of the three categories of speech the author sets forth above, "purely
citizen speech" has the greatest semblance to speech of "non-government
employee" citizens. Accordingly, it should be entitled to the highest level
of scrutiny of the three categories. The author thus proposes that a review
of public employer actions against public employees' speech which
constitutes "purely citizen speech," warrants strict scrutiny. In other words,
if an employee's speech is "purely citizen speech," the employer's
actions4 4 against such speech should be presumed unconstitutional unless
the employer can show that the action is narrowly tailored to satisfy a
compelling interest. In addition to the speech that would fall under the
"purely citizen speech" category, as disserted above, employee speech
alleging violations of fundamental rights including the right to vote, the
right to interstate travel, and the right to criminal appeals would be
reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard. Similarly, speech disclosing
suspect classifications and discriminations on the basis of race, ethnicity,
national origin, and resident alienage would also be reviewed under strict
scrutiny.
2. IntermediateScrutiny- "Citizen-Employee Hybrid Speech"
Under the intermediate scrutiny standard of review, government action
against the employee on the basis of the employee's speech should be
presumed unconstitutional unless the employer shows that the action is
substantially related to an important government interest. As suggested by
its name, speech in the "citizen-employee hybrid speech" is a hybrid of
citizen speech and employee speech." 5 Under this category would fall
speech of public employees who criticize their employer's actions or
actions of any other government employer toward any government

413. See Part IV.B (discussing the classification of speech under the "purely citizen speech"
category).
414. Under the author's framework, employer policies, practices, and procedures should be
similarly scrutinized as employer actions. Thus, where the author mentions "actions, policies,
practices and procedures," can be parenthetically inserted as succedanea.
415. For more discussion of this category of speech and examples of speech under this
category subject to intermediate scrutiny under the author's proposal, see supra Part IV.C
(discussing citizen-employee hybrid speech).
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employee (other than the speaking employee). If the employee speech
alleges government-employer discrimination on the basis of gender or
illegitimacy, intermediate scrutiny of the government action against the
employee should be required.416
When an employee blows the whistle on employer actions of a criminal
or fraudulent nature or other violations of federal, state, or local law, the
speech should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Likewise, when an
employee complains about the government's (other than his or her
government employer) treatment of him or her as an employee or its
handling of his or her employment-related issues, the author would
categorize the speech under the "citizen-employee hybrid speech" category.
Though similar to criticisms non-government employees could make
against a government agency, it is not "purely citizen speech," because it
has elements of employment to it, making it a hybrid. Other examples of
speech that would be subject to the intermediate level scrutiny include
speech of public school teachers regarding the unwarranted severity of
corporal punishment imposed on students; 417 handling of sexual
misconduct against students;418 lowered academic standards;419 handling
of student alcohol use; 42 0 and inappropriate alteration of student grades and
other grading improprieties.421
3. RationalBasis Review- "PurelyEmployee Speech"
The rational basis review is the least stringent of the three-tiers of
review.422 Thus, it should provide leeway for courts to give relative greater

416. The author suggests that in developing the public employment-free speechjurisprudence
based on the author's proposal, the Court track the development of its Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence. Thus, when new suspect classes or fundamental rights are recognized, just as those
would be subject to strict scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, speech involving
those suspect classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny under the public employment-free
speech jurisprudence. Similar reasoning would prevail with quasi-suspect classifications, to which
intermediate scrutiny would apply as new quasi-suspect classifications are identified by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
417. See Bowman v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 723 F.2d 640,643-46 (8th Cir. 1983).
418. See Cromley v. Bd. of Educ. of Lockport Township High Sch. Dist., 17 F.3d 1059, 106063 (7th Cir. 1994).
419. Storlazzi v. Bakey, 894 F. Supp. 494 (D. Mass. 1995).
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. See supra Part IV.A (discussing more on the kinds of speech the author classifies under
the "purely employee speech" category).
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deference to operational efficiency concerns42 3 when reviewing cases in the
public employment-free speech jurisprudence,424 compared to the
"compelling interest" required by strict scrutiny or the "important interest"
required by intermediate scrutiny.
Under the rational basis review the author proposes, there would be a
presumption that public employer action against the employee on the basis
of his or her speech is constitutional; the burden would then be on the
employee to show that the government action is not reasonably (or
rationally) related to a legitimate interest of the employer. As propounded
above, employee speech that criticizes employer and solely deals with the
employer's actions with respect to that particular employee's employment
should constitute "purely employee speech" for purposes of the proposed
three-tier framework.
Likewise, employee speech that proximately arises out of the
employee's own employment dispute with the employer would be subject
to the rational basis review, irrespective of its impact on the public or other
government employees, unless the relative importance of the issue to the
public or to other government employees substantially outweighs the
import of the speech's proximate relation to the employee's employment
dispute with his or her employer. As noted, in such cases, the speech
should be accorded relatively greater protection than "purely employee
speech," classified instead under the "citizen-employee hybrid speech,"
and would be subject to intermediate level scrutiny.
Employee speech alleging discrimination by the employer against the
employee on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or alienage,
however, will be subject to strict scrutiny, as would employee speech
alleging violations by the employer of the employee's fundamental rights
as those rights relate to the employee's employment.4 5 Employee speech
whistleblowing about the employer's unethical practices, which do not

423. Operational efficiency concerns articulated in the Pickering balancing test can be
accounted for in the different "interests" of the government, as each tier requires: compelling
interest for strict scrutiny; important interest for intermediate scrutiny; and legitimate interest for
rational basis review.
424. Recall, in Pickering and its progeny, the U.S. Supreme Court gives relatively greater
weight to operational efficiency in reviewing cases in the public employment-free speech
jurisprudence. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
425. This is the case, even though the speech is solely related to that employee's own
employment and would traditionally, under the author's model, be classified as "purely employee"
speech. However, because it involves discrimination on the basis of a suspect classification or
violation of a fundamental right, it would be subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review. The
same reasoning applies to discrimination on the basis of a quasi-suspect classification, to which
intermediate scrutiny is applicable.
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constitute violations of law, should be reviewed under rational basis review
because they lack statutory protection. This rational basis review the author
proposes is consistent with the Court's holding in Connick:4 26 "When
employee speech concerning office policy arises from an employment
dispute concerning the very application of that policy to the speaker,
additional weight must be given to the supervisor's view that the employee
has threatened the authority of the employer to run the office."42 7
In applying the rational basis review, courts should not speculate about
legitimate government ends that could justify the government action
against the employee.428 As Gunther stated in another context, "[tihe
[rational basis review] model would have the Court assess the justification
for the ... [government action] largely in terms of information presented
... rather than hypothesizing data of its own. 42 9 In the initial stages of
developing the public employment-free speech jurisprudence using the
three-tier framework, it would be helpful for the Court to track its
development of the Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence until the public
employment-free speech off-shoot is well established as an independent
framework.
TABLE

1: THE PROPOSED THREE-TIER FRAMEWORK AND THE
APPLICABLE CATEGORIES OF SPEECH:

Standard of Review

Category of Speech

Strict Scrutiny

Purely Citizen Speech

Intermediate Scrutiny

Citizen-Employee Hybrid Speech

Rational Basis Review

Purely Employee Speech

426. See supra Parts III & IV (discussing Connick).
427. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 153 (1983).
428. Note that in this respect, the author's proposal is different from the rational basis review
as used by the Court in the Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. Under the rational basis review
applied in Equal Protection cases, government action will withstand rational basis review, even if
"based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n v. Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
429. Gunther, supra note 112, at 47.
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VI. CONCLUSION

In this Article, the author has been guided by three questions:
I. What are the eras in the U.S. Supreme Court's public employment-free
speech jurisprudence?
2. Is there a way to categorize the types of speech that whistleblowing
teachers engage in under the Court's public employment-free speech
jurisprudence?
3. What is the author's proposed constitutional framework for analyzing
whistleblowing cases under the Court's public employment-free speech
jurisprudence?
In Pickering, the seminal case in the public employment-free speech
jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the following test for
reviewing speech of whistleblowing employees. This test, known as the
Pickeringbalancing test, provides: "The problem in any case is to arrive
at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State,
as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees. 4 3' The two aspects of this test, which are to be
weighed in a balance are as follows: (1) the interests of the employee, as
a citizen in speaking on matters of public concern; and (2) the operational
efficiency of the employer.4 3' As revealed in this study and represented in
figure 2 below, however, interpretation and development of the
jurisprudence has resulted in an unbalanced scale ofjustice, where the left
hand scale depicts the greater weight given operational efficiency relative
to the interests of the employee in free speech represented on the right
scale.

430. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
431. See supra Part HI.D (discussing "era of OE > MPC speech").
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FIGURE 2: The BALANCE OF SCALES UNDER THE PICKERING
BALANCING TEST As INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE SUPREME
COURT SINCE 1968:

The author found that the U.S. Supreme Court's public employmentfree speech jurisprudence has been through four different eras: (a) Era of
Categorical Denial; (b) Era of Recognition: Undefined Scope; (c) Era of
Balancing: Scope; and (d) Era of OE > MPC Speech. Progressively, the
eras have resulted in a pseudo-Pickeringbalancing test rather than the
veritable-Pickeringbalancing test articulated in Pickering. Progressive
development of such eras is less likely with a three-tier system, as
proposed by the author, because with the three-tier system, no tier is likely
to prevail for an entire era. Instead, all three tiers are available in every era
for application to the pertinent category of speech, thus curbing
manipulation of a one-tier system as currently exists.
Under the three-tier system, the applicable category of speech is
identified and then subjected to the apropos standard of review. The author
identified three categories of speech: (a) Purely Employee Speech; (b)
Citizen-Employee Hybrid Speech; and (c) Purely Citizen Speech.
The author then proposed a test for reviewing cases in the public
employment-free speech jurisprudence based on the three-tier review
framework used in the Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. The three
levels of scrutiny under this framework are: (a) rational basis; (b)
intermediate scrutiny; and (c) strict scrutiny. Echoing Gunther's words of
wisdom, the author believes that the three-tier "model is, in sum, not a
simple formula capable of automatic, problem-free application. It is a
with substantial
suggestion of a direction for modest interventionism
to the one-tier balancing test
promise.432 Three tiers, as opposed

represented by the Pickeringbalancing test, help account for the different
categories of public employee whistleblowing speech, thus minimizing
room for judicial carte blanche in review of cases. While this proposal has
not been previously applied to the public employment-free speech
jurisprudence, it is not without guidance as would be the case if a test

432. Gunther, supra note 112, at 48.
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previously unapplied in any jurisprudence is proposed. With the author's
proposal, there is a body of work applying the three-tier framework in the
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence that the Court could build upon in
initiating and developing the three-tier framework in the context of the
public employment-free speech jurisprudence.
In applying the three tiers, the Court must "identify and evaluate
separately each analytically distinct ingredient of the contending
interests":... compelling interest under strict scrutiny; important interest
under intermediate scrutiny; and legitimate interest under rational basis
review. Each of the three levels of scrutiny ensures that operational
efficiency and employee speech are accounted for. Since each tier accounts
for the two fundamental doctrinal components the Court identified in the
Pickering balancing test-(1) employee speech; and (2) operational
efficiency (under "compelling interest" for strict scrutiny; "important
interest" for intermediate scrutiny; and "legitimate interest" for rational
basis review)-the three-tier model provides an "opportunity to make
changes without losing doctrinal continuity."' 34 While concerns about stare
decisis may linger, current available precedent in this area of law has left
several questions unanswered. As Gunther notes: "when solid precedent
is lacking on many questions, a conservative adherence to stare decisis is
less confining.""
It is important for government employees, including teachers and
administrators, to be able to whistleblow without the lingering threat of
judicially sanctioned retaliation. This would help to ensure that the
interests of students, teachers, and the community are protected. The
author's proposal would move closer to protecting such interests because,
as noted above, it is three-tiered rather than one.43 6 However, in accordance
with Bhagwat's principles, the author recognizes that no analysis,
including the framework proposed, can provide precise answers to all
difficult questions.43 7 As the jurisprudence develops based on the author's
proposal, application and interpretation should unravel the framework's
operational confines and ground the test on firmer footing. Unlike
Pickering, which requires analysis of all categories of employee
whistleblowing speech under the one-tier Pickering balancing test, the
three-tier test provides a tier for each category of employee whistleblowing

433. Id. at 7.
434. Id. at 4.
435. Id.
436. As Justice Marshall noted in his concurring opinion in Plyler,457 U.S. at 231, there is
"wisdom.. . [in] ... employing an approach that allows for varying levels of scrutiny." Id.
437. Bhagwat, supra note 295, at 326.
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speech. Thus, the three categories are not cramped into one tier but rather
uncramped in three.
To prevent employers from making uninformed decisions, public
employers, including schools and school districts, must educate their
employees about their whistleblowing rights and the costs and benefits
associated with whistleblowing. For example, professional development
activities could be offered to facilitate this education. If the current trend
in the development of the public employment-free speech jurisprudence
continues, then Justice Black's famous premonition that "we will in the
'
long run have it [free speech] for none but the cringing and the craven,"438
may become a reality for teachers and other public employees.
To avoid the extraordinary costs and consequences that could result to
employer or employee when employees whistleblow and institute judicial
proceedings based on employer retaliatory actions, school districts should
implement policies that allow and encourage employees to speak privately
with their employers about their concerns, irrespective of the category of
employee speech involved, so that emanating issues could be resolved
internally without litigation. In that way, the employer will save the
prohibitive costs of defending a lawsuit, while the employee gets to keep
his or her job-a win-win solution. Consequently, the work environment
remains as amicable as possible and excellent teachers are not lost.439 As
the Court noted in Garcetti,"[g]iving employees an internal forum for their
speech will discourage them from concluding that the safest avenue of
expression is to state their views in public." ' If schools also strive to be
learning centers for impacting culture, such examples of irenical dispute
resolution could inspire students in ways untold. School districts should
solicit teacher input and work with the union to implement the internal
procedures." Alternatively, the school district could contract with third
parties to serve as each employee's spokesperson. Schools should provide
avenues in any procedure implemented for protected public whistleblowing
after the employee has exhausted administrative remedies. Additionally,
phone numbers for anonymous calls could be provided to facilitate
employee whistleblowing.
438. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952).
439. As noted in supra note 113, a number of teachers who whistleblow have excellent
performance records.
440. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2006).
441. These suggestions may similarly enhance conciliation with respect to other
whistleblowers. The author focuses on the plight of whistleblowing teachers in this conclusion,
given the fact that the media spotlight on this plight is minimal in comparison to other public
employees, as is evident also in the various cases about public employee whistleblowing. Likewise,
the author intends the framework proposed in this Article as universal to all public employees.
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State legislatures and Congress should mandate that school districts
keep records of teachers terminated or disciplined for whistleblowing. This
would further accountability in employer action against whistleblowing
teachers and provide greater visibility to the problem. Unfortunately,
unlike with corporations, the media spotlight is not nearly as focused on
the plight of whistleblowing teachers. Thus, there has been little
motivation to address this plight as thoroughly as has been done with
respect to the corporate arena.
Policymakers need to provide incentives for school districts to
implement policies to facilitate internal resolutions of employee
whistleblowing concerns. Without such incentives, school districts may not
appreciate the essence of providing such conciliatory mechanisms,
especially if districts are aware of the current trend of interpretation and
application of the Pickering balancing test, which is increasingly more
favorable to employers. Such incentives could include grants, tax breaks,
and increasing revenue allocations. State legislatures could also statutorily
require such conciliatory mechanism and regularly audit its implementation
and effectiveness. School districts should also internally, formatively, and
summatively evaluate any conciliatory mechanisms implemented to
address employee whistleblowing concerns. Empirical research should be
done to determine what would incentivize school districts and other public
employers to implement conciliatory mechanisms; such incentives should
be accordingly provided. It is a matter of social justice and responsibility
owed to the many teachers and the other public employees who continue
to face employer retaliation for whistleblowing that the courts begin to
apply a better framework to public employee whistleblowing.

